In the name of Allah
the most
Compassionate and Merciful

In the name of Allah, the most compassionate,
the most merciful

25 years of relationship between the U.S. and Shah's regime left Iran, a country plundered and its resources depleted, its harvests burned, its farms uncultivated and barren, its army completely equipped but non-committed, its industries comprised of assembly-lines, and its society overwhelmed with consumption and corruption. America had deeply penetrated into the constitution of the Shah's regime, and by isolating people from their humanistic and Islamic beliefs and values began to loot and plunder Iran.

American means of infiltration her methods of exercising power,and finally her ways of looting and destroying this nation's faith, honor and resources were repeatedly reviewed in in previous books. A search into these methods provides us with guidlines; to a better understanding of man's infinite greed, lost and deviated in his pursuit of evolution, deceived by ignorance, and turned ruthless out of obstinacey. In this course of deviation everyone interprets ruthlessness as kindness, and tries to translate ignorance and greed into scientific and honorable actions. Conceit and ambition, thereby, turns into Sacred and adjectives, and as a result of the growth of capitalists the bread of the hungry is stolen away, the God-given resources are plundered, and man and his mind are exploited. Finally all means and facilities along with justifications and deceit serve to satisfy the endless greed of the deviated man.

Imperialism and Communism that contradict each other in appearance, are actually two manifestations of one motive, trying to acheive one goal, and that is to deprive man from humanity. Both schools of thought change man's mind into their own slave, and alienate it from God. There is no difference between being a slave of America and Russia, Imperialism and/or Communism.

The two superpowers objective in devouring world resources has brought about their competition in this respect, and they have been labelling this rivalry, according to their ideological justifications as the endless war of two world-views namely, Socialism and Capitalism each, apparently, tryng to lead man into their own imaginary utopia. But, these messengers of poverty and corruption are in actuality paving the way for their further influence of a country by frightening a nation from a scarecrow. By exploiting the communist scarecrow in its subject countries, the U.S. justifies its presence, crimes, suppressive

measures, pacts and military sales. Russia too does the same in its satellite states.In the midst of these compaings, the budget of subject countries boost the market for superpowers' weaponries and goods and the shacks of the oppressed are destroyed and exploited for the development of superpowers palaces.

They begin negotiations, whenever necessary,in order to divide the booty, and talk of disarmament while turning under-dominant countries into ware-houses for their own nuclear and non-atomic weapons. In this so-called war between the two superpowers, each is trying to eliminate the other as its partner in devouring the world.

The above mentioned points and the documents contained in this collection explains the fact that Soviet intentions and functions vis-a-vis Iran and its developments follow the framework of 25 years of America's presence in Iran.

Block creating and polarizing in the world had alingned Iran with the U.S. while a neighbour of Russia. It was not only a military and a trade base for the U.S. , but a place in which U.S.A. carried out most of its secret activities against the Soviet Union. Meanwhile Russia considered Iran a developing country, ignoring the nature of the Shah's regime. By neglecting basic principles of Marxism,it also decided to gain intelligence against the U.S. and to some extent help its own faction in Iran grow in strength. On the situation of Iran during the Shah and about the goals of the East and Western superpowers Imam Khomeini has remarked as follows;

" We have a country of our own;we do not want America to be our sponsor; we don't want the U.S. to take all benefits, we don't want Russia to do that either ; we don't want Russia to exploit Iranian gas reserves , and America to take away our oil. We will not allow them any more to come here and do what ever they wish."

The Imam thus clarifies not only the two superpowers foreign policy, but also their positions vis-a-vis Iran.

Shah's regime was called progressive and justified by Marxist principles, and its obvious dependence on the U.S. imperialism was also accepted as an irreversible reality. This attitude was taken to pave the way for the easy establishment of a channel of influence, and finally materialize their intentions. In this direction, Russia succeeded in signing many economic and military agreements with Iran, even Russian means of propaganda labelled Shah's crimes as suppressive measures against reactionary elements and those opposed to progression. In an iterview, Reuter had asked the Imam ;

"What's your opinion about Russia? "

And Imam Khomeini responded;

"Russia supports the Shah's regime, even Russian representatives in the U.N. have defended the Shah, Russia too, like America and Britain, commits all crimes in order to succeed in devouring Iran's resoures."

The extension of these policies which mean the loss of all nations' interests for the maintenance of superpowers' domination in Islamic countries and the third world, sheds doubt on Russian claims for

supporting the under-dominated nations, and exposes their ugly colonialist nature in the world. In response to another question the Imam said the following;

" Because of its opportunistic policies, Russia has damaged its prestige in many areas, she believes she can exploit any situation to her own benefit. We will cut the hands of Russia from Iran... . Russia because of its current approach in dominating muslim nations, does not deserve to be called as the supporter of the oppressed, and the opponent of exploitation."

When the pounding demonstrations of the muslim Umma against the American presence and the anti-Islamic nature of the regime began, Iran turned into a center of foreign attentions. Americans were doing all in order to maintain their presence, and Russia was trying to hang on to whatever gauranteed her interests best. A lack of clear, understanding on the nature of the Islamic revolution which had confused America for a long time, had also bewildered Russia to such an extent that she could not take a clear position with regard to the Iranian events, the great role of religion in our revolution and the functioning of the uncompromising leadership of Imam Khomeini. But in the winter of 1978 Russia decided to support the revolution and confirm its anti-imperialist stances, hoping to open more room for herself in Iran, because Tudeh party had grown to be infamous as a result of all crimes, and treason it had committed, and also because, for the Soviets there was no other coherent political organization capable of coping with Muslim masses and their leadership. The course of events, the decisive approach of the revolution leadership in dealing with policies of the East and Western superpowers, and the unconcilliatory attitude of Islam towards all features of oppression compelled Russia to vacillate its propaganda compaigns, pretending to oppose the provisional government because of its policy of establishing relations with the U.S.,where as in fact ,Russia took this course for her fear of the expansion of Islamic thoughts.

With the establishment of Islamic Republic and the expulsion of imperialism and, its hirelings from our Islamic country, the largest espionage bases of America that operated against the Soviets, from within the Iranian territory,were also destroyed,which also culminated in termination of C.I.A. network operations in our country. Following this precious opportunity,Russians exploited their hypocritical policies and under the quise of supporting the Islamic Republic began to foster groups that were dependent on Moscow in order to achieve two goals; first to bring them to power in Iran through the special Soviet tactics, and second to materialize its centuries old dream of gaining access to the rich resources of Iran and finally to the Persian Gulf waters. The most loyal of all these groups was the Tudeh party which despite all other leftist groups adopted one particular political policy which was always dictated by Kremlin. By supporting the Islamic Republic, this party, not only was carrying out Kremlin policies, but was also trying to decrease people's disgust of the activities of this party in particular, and communists in general.

Our revolution is still moving forward and exposes all policies of superpowers aimed at plundering the wealth of our nation, and calls on all other nations to free themselves from the clutches of the East and Western powers, and it will turn into a guidelight for the oppressed who have chosen the course of freedom and independence from the superpowers' dominations.

Before explaining the documents contained in this collection we shall have a part of Imam Khomeini's speech addressing all walks of people hoping it to give guidelines for the liberation of all the oppressed from the clutches of the colonialists, just as it showed to our nation how they should determine their own fate.

"RISE AND AWAKEN THOSE WHO ARE ASLEEP, BECOME LIVE AND ENLIVEN THE DEAD, AND MAKE SACRIFICES FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF THE RED AND BLACK COLONIALISM AND THEIR LACKIES. THROW THESE OIL-MONGRERS AND THEIR NOTORIOUS MERCENARIES OUT OF ISLAMIC COUNTRIES AS IF THEY WERE NOTHING BUT GARBAGE. REFRAIN FROM PARTICIPATING IN THEIR ENDLESS CEREMONIES THAT ARE LIKE LIGHTS IN GRAVE-YARDS. I HOPE THAT YOU MY DEAR ONES HAVE A HAPY TIME ON THE DESTRUCTION OF COLONIALISM AND ITS HIRELINGS, AND I HOPE THE YOUNG ONES WILL BE ABLE TO WITNESS IT, IF WE THE OLD ONES COULD NOT."

Documents related to Russia are contained in seven volumes and are comprised of four essential parts;

The first includes the following sections; .

1-Biographic reports and informations on Russian deplomatic figures and officers-obtaining information on these figures abroad,and evaluating their weaknesses for them to be hired in the future and exploited in political and intelligence fields, was the main objective of this section of documents.

2-Reports on the meetings and negotiations of the American and Russian embassies' officers.

Other than preparing biographic informations, this section deals with an evaluation of Russian positions with regards to the current events of Iran and the world. It also contains information on the internal situation of Russia and her diplomatic incidents. In these conversations and meetings all catastrophies brought on the deprived nation through the superpowers' colonialist policies go unheeded, and all human aspects are rediculed in the context of mutual ties and political justifications.

3-Security problems between the Shah's regime and soviets and their clandestine operations in Iran, and American reports to SAVAK and Shah on Russian spies stationed in Iran.

4- An assessment of political/economic and military developments between Iran and Russia before and after the Islamic Revolution and Iran's position vis-a-vis these events.

5-A clarification of Russian political and military domination in the world specially in the Indian ocean. These documents are mostly concerned with Russian attempts, successes and failures in the area of competition. One document headlined "Soviet position in the third world" reviews Russia's situation, its rate of influence, and political and/or military participation in African states(Muzambique, Ethiopia, and Angola), Iraq, Afghanistan, Persian Gulf, etc. It demonstrates the similarity of Russian and American imperialistic goals. It

should be mentioned that although, the document is related only to the situation of Russia, yet third-world-nations' awarenrss of America's domination would lead them to such a comparison.

6- The impact of the Islamic revolution on Russian trends of thought and position with regards to Iran and their side-effects on muslims within Russia.

The second part includes 3 sections;

1-A look at the Russian gas and oil industries and the Soviet gas pipeline. C.I.A. activities in industrial and technological areas and its influence over these areas are contained in these documents. They explain oil and gas situation, the quality of products, equipment and technological needs, and the Russian deficiencies in maintaining the operation of such industries.

. 2-Syberian economic developments. This section too includes C.I.A. activities for obtaining industrial and technological information. It includes information on Syberian natural resources, and the quality of industries operating in Syberia.

3-This section deals with Iran's economic - military, and cultural relations with Russia and the Soviet block.

The third part includes three sections;

1- A paper prepared by C.I.A. titled "Soviet intelligence operations against Americans " explains how Russia attempts to hire Americans, infiltrates in American installations abroad to obtain intelligence needed. Another document headlined " Security breefings " provides the reader with examples of Soviet intelligence operations against the U.S.

2-Some documents are related with American authorities' instructions, security and job-related measures to be respected when contacts are made with Russian and the communist blocks' diplomatic staff, etc.

3-Three files from Airforce special research department (the only U.S. defence department unit which was responsible for the security of American military personnel abroad and provided American military contractors with anti-intelligence and anti-terrorist coverage. These documents are signed by Bill Crane, Larry Gil and others, explaining American espionage activities in hiring Russians and the relationship of this department and C.I.A.

There are also a few reconstructed documents in this section which includes information by the C.I.A. branch in U.S. embassy Tehran, on Russian figures. Another document titled "Russia and the Eastern Europe " contains information on U.S. satellite activities and the military information collected this way.

The fourth part includes two essential sections;

1- defectors- These documents expose the hypocricies of superpowers specially America with regards to issues such as political defectors. They also shed light on campaigns and deceptions they resort to in order to convince their people and those of the world. To hire communist officers and nationals such as Chinese Russian, and the communist block citizens takes place for two purposes first, to exploit them psychologically, second use or exploit them for political and compaign purposes. All approaches and instructions dealing with defectore are contained in these papers.

2-Other subjects included here are executive forms and instructions,

essential conversation forms in English, Chinese, and Russian to facilitate the absorption of a defector, ways of making emergency contact through telephone and correspondence, etc.

MUSLIM STUDENTS FOLLOWING THE
LINE OF THE IMAM

U.S.S.R.



LAND

22,274,000 km²; 9.3% cultivated, 37.1% forest and brush, 2.6% urban, industrial, and transportation, 16.8% pasture and natural hay land, 34.2% desert, swamp, or waste

Land boundaries: 20,619 km

WATER

Limits of territorial waters (claimed): 12 nm (fishing 200 nm)

Coastline: 46,670 km (incl. Sakhalin)

PEOPLE

Population: 263,818,000 (July 1979), average annual growth rate 0.9% (current)

Nationality: noun—Soviet(s); adjective—Soviet

Ethnic divisions: 74% Slavic, 26% among some 170 ethnic groups

Language: more than 200 languages and dialects (at least 18 with more than 1 million speakers); 76% Slavic group, 8% other Indo-European, 11% Altaic, 3% Uralian, 2% Caucasian

Literacy: 98.5% of population (ages 9-49)

Labor force: civilian 138 million (mid-year 1978), 25% agriculture, 75% industry and other non-agricultural fields, unemployed not reported, shortage of skilled labor reported

GOVERNMENT

Legal name: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Type: Communist state

Capital: Moscow

Political subdivisions: 15 union republics, 20 autonomous republics, 6 krays, 121 oblasts, and 8 autonomous oblasts

Legal system: civil law system as modified by Communist legal theory; revised constitution adopted 1977; no judicial review of legislative acts; legal education at 18 universities and 4 law institutes; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction

National holiday: October Revolution Day, 7 November

Branches: Council of Ministers (executive), Supreme Soviet (legislative), Supreme Court of U.S.S.R.* (judicial)

Government leaders: Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and Chairman of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R., Supreme Soviet; Aleksey N. Kosygin, Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers

Suffrage: universal over age 18; direct, equal

Elections: to Supreme Soviet every 5 years; 1,500 deputies elected in 1979; 71.7% party members

Political party: Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) only party permitted

Voting strength (1979 election): 174,944,173 persons over 18; allegedly 99.99% voted

Communists: over 16 million party members

Other political or pressure groups: Komsomol, trade unions, and other organizations which facilitate Communist control

Member of: CEMA, Geneva Disarmament Conference, IAEA, ICAC, ICAO, ICES, ILO, International Lead and Zinc Study Group, IMCO, IPU, ISO, ITC, ITU, IWC—International Whaling Commission, IWC—International Wheat Council, U.N., UNESCO, UPU, Warsaw Pact, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO

ECONOMY

GNP: $1,066.5 billion (1978, in 1977 U.S. prices), $4,080 per capita; in 1978 percentage shares were—56% consumption, 34% investment, 10% government and other, including defense (based on 1970 GNP in rubles at adjusted factor cost); average annual growth rate of real GNP (1971-77), 3.8%, average annual growth rate (1976-78), 3.6%

Agriculture: principal food crops—grain (especially wheat), potatoes; main industrial crops—sugar, cotton, sunflowers, and flax; degree of self-sufficiency depends on fluctuations in crop yields; calorie intake, 3,250 calories per day per capita in recent years

Fishing: catch 9.7 million metric tons (1977); exports 403,800 metric tons (1977), imports 32,500 metric tons (1977)

Major industries: diversified, highly developed capital goods industries; consumer goods industries comparatively less developed

Shortages: natural rubber, bauxite and alumina, tantalum, tin, tungsten, fluorspar, and molybdenum

Crude steel: 163 million metric ton capacity as of 1 January 1979; 151 million metric tons produced in 1978, 578 kg per capita

Electric power: 249,500,000 kW capacity (1978); 1,202 billion kWh produced (1978), 4,580 kWh per capita

Exports: $52,392.6 million (f.o.b., 1978); fuels (particularly petroleum and derivatives), metals, agricultural products (timber, grain), and a wide variety of manufactured goods (primarily capital goods)

Imports: $50,794.8 million (f.o.b., 1978); specialized and complex machinery and equipment, textile fibers, consumer manufactures, steel products (particularly large diameter pipe), and any significant shortages in domestic production (for example, grain imported following poor domestic harvests)

Major trade partners: $103.2 billion (1978 total turnover); trade 60% with Communist countries, 28% with industrialized West, and 12% with less developed countries

Aid: economic—total extended to less developed countries (1978), $3,707 million; total economic extensions (1954-78), $17.1 billion; military—total extended (1978), $1.8 billion

Official monetary conversion rate: 0.6811 rubles=US$1 (average 1978)

Fiscal year: calendar year

COMMUNICATIONS

Railroads: 140,504 km total; 138,671 km broad gage (1.524 m); 1,833 km narrow gage (mostly 0.750 m); 110,015 km broad gage single track; 40,941 km electrified; does not include industrial lines (1978)

Highways: 1,564,000 km total; 322,000 km asphalt, concrete, stone block; 372,000 km asphalt treated, gravel, crushed stone; 870,000 km earth (1976)

Inland waterways: 146,400 km navigable, exclusive of Caspian Sea (1979)

Pipelines: 57,000 km crude oil; 13,000 km refined products; 115,000 km natural gas

Ports: 52 major (most important: Leningrad, Murmansk, Odessa, Novorossiysk, Ilichevsk, Vladivostok, Nakhodka, Arkhangel'sk, Riga, Tallinn, Kaliningrad, Liepaja, Ventspils, Nikolayev, Sevastopol); 116 selected minor; major inland ports: Rostov, Volgograd, Gorkiy, Khabarovsk, Kiev, and Moscow (1979)

Freight carried: rail—3,758 million metric tons, 3,426.0 billion metric ton/km (1978); highways—22.7 billion metric tons, 380 billion metric ton/km (1977); waterway—520.0 million metric tons, 231.0 billion metric ton/km, excluding Caspian Sea in approximately 16,000 waterway craft with 8,000,000 metric tons capacity (1978)

Merchant marine: 1,737 ships (1,000 GRT or over) totaling 13,504,800 GRT, 18,676,400 DWT; includes 69 passenger, 1,201 cargo, 19 container, 36 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 291 tanker, 8 liquefied gas, 93 bulk, 8 combination ore/oil, 12 specialized carriers; 646 merchant ships based in Black Sea, 392 in Baltic Sea, 445 in Soviet Far East, and 244 in Barents/White Sea (C)

Civil air: 1,251 major transport aircraft (1977) (S)

Airfields: 3,535 total; 765 with permanent-surface runways; 55 with runways over 3,500 m; 387 with runways 2,500-3,499 m, 1,078 with runways 1,000-2,499 m, 2,015 with runways less than 1,000 m; 37 heliports (S)

Telecommunications: extensive and relatively modern domestic and international systems maintained primarily for official use; 19.3 million telephones; an estimated 37,000 telephone exchanges; 83,100 main and branch telegraph offices; about 135 main AM broadcast network stations; 280 FM broadcast and 40,000 wired-broadcast distribution stations; 59.8 million radio and 56 million wired broadcast receivers; 1,620 TV broadcast and rebroadcast stations; 55 million TV receivers (C)

DEFENSE FORCES

Military manpower: males 15-49, 67,982,000; 54,220,000 fit for military service; 2,367,000 reach military registration age (17) annually on the average (C)

Personnel: (estimated as of March 1979) 2,453,400 ground forces; 424,100 naval forces (excluding Maritime Border Guard); 513,200 air forces; 344,600 strategic rocket forces; 625,700 air defense forces; 470,200 paramilitary forces; these strengths, redistributed to correspond with U.S. force programs rather than with Soviet military structure, are set forth as follows: (S/NF)

Total Estimated Military and Paramilitary Strength (S)

Command and General Support	1,307,300
General Purpose Ground Forces	1,693,000
General Purpose Naval Forces	308,300
General Purpose Air Forces	297,800
Strategic Attack Forces	267,400
Strategic Defense Forces	498,900
Frontier Troops	159,500
Internal Troops	299,000
Total	4,831,200

Total Estimated Personnel released into reserve system for last 5 years (S)

Command and General Support	2,415,000
General Purpose Ground Forces	3,210,000
General Purpose Naval Forces	500,000
General Purpose Air Forces	565,000
Strategic Attack Forces	560,000
Strategic Defense Forces	925,000
Frontier Troops	295,000
Internal Troops	510,000
Total	8,980,000

Major ground units: general purpose ground forces—24 armies, 10 corps, 173 divisions, plus 12 artillery divisions, 150 brigades, 250 regiments, and many smaller combat support units (S)

Ships: submarines—70 nuclear-powered ballistic missile, 16 ballistic missile, 44 nuclear-powered cruise missile, attack 24 cruise missile attack, 45 nuclear powered attack, 144 attack, 4 coastal, 1 auxiliary, 4 radar picket, 4 training; surface ships—2 guided missile VTOL aircraft carriers, 2 guided missile aviation cruisers, 25 guided missile cruisers, 10 light cruisers, 32 guided missile destroyers, 36 destroyers, 24 guided missile frigates, 35 frigates, 104 light frigates, 123 patrol combatants, 96 amphibious warfare ships, 162 mine warfare ships, 444 coastal patrol-river/roadstead craft, 82 amphibious warfare craft, 238 mine warfare craft, 84 underway replenishment ships, 66 material support ships, 135 fleet support ships, 457 other auxiliaries (S)

Aircraft: 15,125 operational units; by force, strength data follows: Long-Range Aviation, 869 (239 long-range bombers, 630 intermediate range bombers); Aviation of Air Defense, 2,653 fighters, 9 airborne warning and control; Soviet Tactical Aviation, 4,538 combat aircraft (3,750 fighters, 106 medium-range bombers, 633 reconnaissance, 49 electronic warfare); Naval Aviation, 1,121 bombers, reconnaissance, fighter, and ASW aircraft (87 long-range, 511 intermediate-range bombers/tanker/reconnaissance, 71 fighters/fighter-bombers, 375 ASW including 203 helicopters, 77 miscellaneous training type aircraft); Support aircraft strength: 5,935 transports and helicopters (transports: 1,635 (119 long-range, 905 medium-range, 611 short-range); helicopters: 4,300 (2,033 combat assault, 2,267 admin/liaison) (S)

Defensive missiles: Tactical—about 3 SA-2 battalions, 37 SA-3 battalions, 135 SA-4 battalions, 40 SA-6 regiments, and 13 SA-8 regiments are deployed with Soviet Theatre General Purpose Forces and Soviet forces in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Mongolia. Approximately 225 SA-9 fire units and about 20,000 SA-7 missiles are available in maneuver regiments. Some of these tactical SAM systems could augment the national air defense forces in times of crisis. Strategic—defensive missile force includes 999 operationally-deployed surface-to-air missile sites and complexes (12,172 launch rails); 56 SA-1 sites (3,242 launch rails) deployed only in defense of Moscow; 481 SA-2 sites (2,886 launch rails) provide point defense of important

strategic targets and barrier defense of the country. Deployed primarily in peripheral areas and in already SAM-defended areas to provide low altitude coverage are 337 SA-3 sites (628 dual-rail and 720 four-rail platforms) with 4,136 launch rails; 125 SA-5 complexes (1,905 launch rails) provide a barrier and vital area defense of targets throughout the Soviet Union. Deployed around the city of Moscow are 8 ABM-1 sites (64 launchers). (S NF)

Offensive missiles: Strategic—about 1,400 ICBM launchers and about 600 MR/IRBM's (S)

Nuclear weapons: satisfies major requirements of Soviet forces (C)

Supply: fully supplies own needs and produces large quantities of all types of materiel for export; Warsaw Pact countries provide the bulk of amphibious and auxiliary ship replacements as well as trainers and other light aircraft; some light armored vehicles obtained from Eastern Europe as an economic measure (C)

Military budget (announced): for fiscal year ending 31 December 1979, only the figure 17.2 billion rubles was released; this figure is manipulated for political purposes and covers only a small portion of total military expenditures; the estimated dollar costs of military activities in 1978 excluding pensions, are $146.55 billion (in 1978 dollars) (S)

INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY

Committee of State Security (KGB), domestic/foreign; Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU), General Staff of the Ministry of Defense, strategic intelligence collection abroad; the military services also have intelligence components (RU's) for collection of order of battle information; Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), all-union agency for civil police, Internal Troops, fire protection, prisons, and camps (S NF)

I.

SI

SECRET AIR POUCH

TEHRAN 113

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION ON DANIIL SIMONOVICH KOSYAKOV

In accordance with the Department's airgram A-63 of February 22, 1950, following is the information available to this Embassy at present on Daniel Simonovich Kosiakarov, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy.

Age: About 42 years old.

Personal Appearance: Tall, partly bald, mendescript brown hair, dark blue eyes, pleasant expression.

Personality: On the surface friendly and gregarious. Well liked by the Persians. Intelligent, said to be ruthless and machiavellian in his work.

Previous Career: Press Attache to the Soviet Embassy during the last war. Expert in newspaper relations and propaganda in general. He was in Tabriz during the formative stages of the Democrat Party and the Azerbaijan National Government. Later he was Consul in Meshed for a while. Reportedly he worked amongst the Kurdish tribes in the Meshed district.

Present Activities: His title is "First Secretary of Embassy in Charge of Press Affairs". Actually he seems to occupy a more important position in the Soviet Embassy hierarchy. Reportedly he has been negotiating with unidentified Iranian officials for the purpose of fostering more friendly relations between the U.S.S.R. and Iran. It is stated that he had a hand in the reorganization of the clandestine Tudeh Party.

Remarks: He speaks fluent Persian without an accent.

John G. Wiley

GVPDecker:ib 3/20/50
File 350.)

Copies to Moscow, Tabriz and Meshed.

SECRET

ORIGIN: ACTION
INR/B-10-3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

SECRET

POL 6-1. USSR
XR POL 17 USSR-IRAN

FOR RM USE ONLY

CA-13804 NO. | SECRET | COPY | SERIES B HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : The Amembassy, TEHRAN

This document consists of 2 pages. Number 1 of 50 copies. Series B

INFO : BAGHDAD, MOSCOW

noted 6/15/63 pm

CNAD

ACTION COPY JUN 7 3 44 PM '63

FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE DATE:

SUBJECT Soviet Ambassador to Iran

REF : Your Telegram No. 1046, May 30, 1963

[The following information is not to be released to foreign nationals.]

In reply to reference telegram, the following information is submitted on Grigoriy Titovich ZAYTSEV, announced by the Iranian press as scheduled shortly to succeed N. M. Pegov as the Soviet Ambassador to Iran. At present chief of the Middle Eastern Countries Division of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), a position to which he was appointed in September 1961, Zaytsev has been variously described as an Arabic scholar, an expert in economics, and a specialist in international law. He has been in foreign affairs since 1944, serving as Soviet chief of mission to both the Kingdom and the Republic of Iraq, and as Ambassador to the Netherlands. With the Exception of the latter tour, his service with the MFA has been exclusively concerned with Arab affairs.

Born in Moscow in 1902, Zaytsev reportedly received his education at the Institute of Economics and at the Institute of Oriental Studies in Moscow, where he graduated in 1933. He was then assigned to Tehran in an undetermined capacity for the years 1933-34. During the early 1930's he attended several economic conferences and later worked in the USSR People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade until his transfer in 1944 to the Foreign Ministry, where he served in a senior position in the Eastern Division. Late in the same year, Zaytsev was named Minister to the Kingdom of Iraq where he remained until August 1948. During this tour he reportedly was active among Iraqi subversive groups. He also took a public stand against the government's trial of local Communists,

NEA-2
SOV-2
RSB-2
INR-3

ACTION: POL
ACTION TAKEN UNIT
INFO
AMB
POL
ECON
C
OIR
USIS
USAID
ARMY
NAVY
3

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

SECRET

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY
☐ In ☒ Out

FORM DS-323

Drafted by: INR/CS/BR:RWubbeler:ae 6/4/63
Contents and Classification Approved by: INR/CS/BR - Mr. William J. Radford
Clearances: NEA - Mr. M. G. Tiger (in substance)
SOV - Mr. L. W. Bowden (in substance)
INR/CS/ILB - Mr. Clyde W. Snider

and stated that the Soviets would not continue to tolerate the apparently hostile attitude of the Iraqi government. When Zaytsev's name was submitted in mid-1948 as the new Soviet Minister to Egypt, the Egyptian government delayed acceptance of the proposed agrement on the grounds that he had been a "trouble-maker" in Iraq. Moscow was then forced to withdraw the candidacy on the pretext of Zaytsev's poor health. Zaytsev returned to Moscow presumably to work for the MFA, and in December 1948 was promoted to the rank of Minister, First Class.

In 1949 Zaytsev was appointed Ambassador to the Netherlands, where he concerned himself with propaganda efforts and with the repatriation of Dutch prisoners-of-war interned in the USSR. In the summer of 1953 he left Holland and became Chief of the MFA's Near and Middle Eastern Countries Division. In this capacity Zaytsev accompanied Foreign Minister Shepilov on a June 1956 trip to Egypt and Syria. In August of that year he participated in the London Conference on the Suez problem and in October 1956 was a member of the Soviet delegation to the UN Security Council, where the Suez crisis was being discussed. Shortly after returning to Moscow, he was named Chief of the Near Eastern Countries Division, one of the two directorates created when the Near and Middle Eastern Countries Division was reorganized sometime in 1957. In July 1958 he became Ambassador to the Republic of Iraq and, as the first ambassador to be accredited to the new government, the dean of the diplomatic corps as well. Zaytsev began a program of vigorous activity in Iraqi affairs, and was assisted by an embassy staff which reportedly was exceptionally well trained in that area and in intelligence operations. Zaytsev was in Iraq until 1961; upon returning to Moscow he was placed in his current position. In December 1962 he was a member of a Soviet government delegation to Iran which exchanged documents regarding the Soviet-Iranian Frontier Pact with representatives of the Iranian government.

Said to be professorial in appearance, Zaytsev is described as a good speaker with a generally agreeable personality. His knowledge of English is limited, but he knows Arabic, German, and French, and speaks Persian quite well. His wife, Klavdiya, appears to have a warm and friendly personality and a sense of humor; she speaks English and Persian. Their son, Yuriy, now in his early 20's, is living and studying in Moscow.

RUSK

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

June 6, 1963

To : USIS and Embassy

From : Henry L. Davis

Subject: Comments Concerning Gregori Zeitsev

Following is a report on a conversation on June 5, 1963, between Mr. Reza Amini, USIS Public Affairs Adviser, and Mr. Bahram Bushehripour, former Iranian press attache in Moscow, who was requested to leave the Soviet Union in 1962 at the insistence of the Soviet government:

Mr. Bahram Bushehripour came to my office this morning to obtain a copy of the toast President Kennedy made at the state dinner given in honor of the Shahanshah at the White House on April 11, 1962. Mr. Bushehripour is writing a book on his mission in Moscow, which he would like to call "In the Belly of the Bear". These words were used by President Kennedy in his toast to describe the difficult situation under which the Shah of Iran has always lived. "We do not live in easy times ourselves", the President said at the time, "but we do not live in the belly of the bear. But he (the Shah of Iran) does -- and has done it for years, and his country is still free."

As I have found Bushehripour always well informed about Soviet activities in Iran, I asked him what he knows about Gregori Zeitsev, who is reported to be the new Soviet Ambassador to Iran. Mr. Bushehripour told me he knows Zeitsev very well, as he has met and talked to him many times when he was serving as the Iranian Press Attache in Moscow. He pulled several sheets of paper out of his pocket and gave me the following dates and comments:

Gregor Citoievich Zeitsev entered the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1944 with the rank of Minister and began work in the Middle East Division as Deputy Chief. "The reason that he started his career with the rank of a Minister," Bushehripour commented, "was the fact that he was a well-known expert on Middle East affairs and is a graduate of the Oriental School of Moscow University. Otherwise, he would have started as an attache."

Zeitsev served in Iran from 1945 to 1949, the period when the Tudeh Party became well organized and very active in Iran. During his stay in Iran he was the actual boss of the Soviet Embassy and had close connections with a number of influential Iranian intellectuals and journalists. Zeitsev returned to Moscow in 1949 and continued his services in the Middle East Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs until 1951 when he was named Soviet Ambassador to The Netherlands. In 1953, he was appointed Chief of the Middle East Division. In this capacity he visited Egypt, Syria and Lebanon and participated in all talks between the Soviet Union and the Arab states. He accompanied Shepilov to Egypt and conducted the negotiations on Soviet aid for the Aswan Dam.

Comrade Zeitsev, said Bushehripour, is an outstanding expert in organizing political parties and perpetrating disturbances. Following the coup which brought Kassem to power in Iraq in 1958, Zeitsev was named Soviet Ambassador to the new regime of Iraq. He was assigned to organize a powerful Communist Party in Iraq, an assignment which he successfully carried out. In 1961, he returned to his former job as Chief of the Middle East Division. In this capacity he established close connections with the diplomats of the Middle East countries in Moscow by giving parties at least once a week.

"Zeitsev, which in Russian means son of a rabbit, is a real son-of-a-bitch," Bushehripour asserted. "We should look for troubles and many headaches after his arrival in Iran, as he has been a prominent member of KOMSOMOL (Communist Youth Organization) and knows very well how to organize the dissatisfied people into a very destructive force against Iran."

* * * * * *

CLASSIFIED CLASSIFIED CLASSIFIED

25 flw

SS
AMB
DCM
POL-3
ECON
CR
USIB
USAID/
MACY
ARMA
AIRA
ALUSMA
ARMISH-3
FILES-2
CR
POUCH:
ISFAHAN
KHORRAM
MESHED
T[illegible]IZ
M[illegible]SCOW

CLASSIFIED CLASSIFIED CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED CLASSIFIED CLASSIFIED

OUTGOING AIRGRAM

Control: 9/196

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NO.: A-178

TO: Department of State

INFO: MOSCOW (by pouch)

FROM: Amembassy TEHRAN

DATE: September 16, 1963

SUBJ: Soviet Ambassador's Courtesy Call

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: The American Ambassador
John A. Armitage, Special Assistant to the Ambassador

The Soviet Ambassador (Gregori Zaitsev)
Mr. Trofimov, Soviet Interpreter

Place: Ambassador Holmes' office

Date: 10:00 a.m., September 11, 1963

The new Soviet Ambassador, Mr. Gregori Zaitsev, together with his interpreter, arrived promptly at 10:00 a.m to pay his courtesy call. He stayed for 40 minutes, during 30-35 of which he carried the conversation, pausing only long enough for brief responses from Ambassador Holmes. Zaitsev spoke most of the time in Russian, utilizing his interpreter, but he appeared to understand most of Ambassador Holmes' remarks in English.

Zaitsev's somewhat rambling and repetitive conversation touched on several subjects. He began by commenting on the signature of the Test Ban Agreement, indicating that he had taken some part in the Moscow conversations. He said this marked an important step in improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations which he hoped would continue to get better. He repeated this theme several times during the conversation. Ambassador Holmes agreed that improved relations were desirable, spoke of his own

Decontrolled following one year.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

SA: JArmitage:vmm 9/14/63

SHRockwell

Ambassador Holmes (draft)

experience in disarmament negotiations and said that real progress in arms reduction would turn around the question of mutual inspection which was an essential to substantial progress in arms control. The Soviet Ambassador did not take issue, but stressed the need for "practical intermediate steps." He referred specifically to the utility of an agreement to reduce or not increase military budgets. Ambassador Zaitsev said there were no direct conflicts of interest between the United States and the USSR which could lead to a disastrous war, but that their differences were of a broader and more general nature. He made reference to the disastrous consequences of a nuclear war not only for the United States and the USSR, but for mankind in general, and mentioned the possibility of diverting money from military purposes to more desirable uses.

The Soviet Ambassador said he and Ambassador Holmes were, of course, primarily concerned about Iran. He expressed the hope that improved U.S.-Soviet relations would also be reflected here and said he wished to assure Ambassador Holmes that the United States should not be jealous of the improved Soviet-Iranian relations which he could assure the Ambassador would "have no bad results." He reverted to this theme repeatedly during the conversation, in spite of Ambassador Holmes' repeated statements that the United States had no interest in bad relations between Iran and the Soviet Union and was not at all concerned over the improvements of such relations. The Soviet Ambassador said that the USSR would be glad to see U. S. assistance to Iran continue or even increase, as this would save the Soviet Union expenditures in Iran. "We have other places to spend money," he noted.

The Soviet Ambassador said that he hoped that he and Ambassador Holmes would be able to see each other often and engage in frank exchanges of views. While their views would not always coincide, such exchange was a necessary part of improving mutual understanding. Ambassador Holmes concurred that such exchange was useful and desirable.

In mentioning the desirability of reducing military expenditures, Ambassador Zaitsev said that such reduction would assist the United States to solve its gold outflow problem which, he said, could, of course, not continue. Ambassador Holmes sought to correct the Soviet Ambassador's impression that military expenditures contributed significantly to the U. S. gold outflow problem, and said pointedly that the United States was not worried that the problem would get out of hand. The Soviet Ambassador seemed to persist in his view.

At one point Ambassador Holmes off-handedly referred to the USSR's relations with China, and the Soviet Ambassador unhesitatingly volunteered comment. There had, he said, been sharp exchanges between the two Governments. Anyone with common sense had seen this. These exchanges had served to clarify the foreign policy positions of the two Governments. It should now be apparent even to those who had been inclined to regard the Soviet policy of "peaceful coexistence" as a pi[illegible] answer that it was, on the contrary, the fundamental basis for Soviet [illegible]gn policy. The Soviet Ambassador implied that the

Soviet Union had persisted in adhering to this policy even though this attitude had contributed to the deterioration of USSR-Chinese Communist relations, and that the world should, therefore, be aware that the Soviet Union attached fundamental importance to the peaceful-coexistence policy.

In response to Ambassador Holmes' query, the Soviet Ambassador said that Pegov, former Soviet Ambassador to Iran, was still on leave in the USSR and that his next assignment had not yet been determined. Supreme Soviet Presidium Chairman Brezhnev will arrive in Iran November 15 and stay six days, Zaitsev said. Ambassador Holmes noted that he had planned to depart on home leave about that time, but was changing his plans to be in Tehran for the first two days or so of Brezhnev's visit.

The Soviet Ambassador said that his speaking knowledge of French was weak, and that while he had studied Persian when he was head of the Near and Middle Eastern Division of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, he had not had much occasion to practice that language. He appears to have a rudimentary speaking knowledge of English and a considerably broader understanding of the language.

For the Ambassador:

John A. Armitage
Special Assistant to the Ambassador
for MSP

CLASSIFIED CLASSIFIED CLASSIFIED

TELEGRAM — Foreign Service of the United States of America

FROM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

CONFIDENTIAL (Classification)

Control: 59

Date: May 5, 1964 RTU 1730

AMB-2
DCM
POL-3
ECON
SA
OR
USIS
USAID/MACY
CRU-2
CR

Chargé STATE

ACTION: Secstate WASHINGTON 1009

INFO: Amembassy CAIRO 31
MOSCOW 40

During conversation with Shah aboard USS BON HOMME RICHARD

POUCH: ISF
KHOR
TAS
MESID

May 2, he told me of conversation he had had with Soviet Ambassador. Shah had let loose with all of his criticism of Nasser, his ambitions and activities, all of which disturbed peace in the Middle East and represented a serious danger for the area. He chided Kuznetsov for Soviet support of such an irresponsible troublemaker as the UAR President. Shah had told Zaytsev he was persuaded Nasser was responsible for Arab propaganda attacks against Iran. Soviet Ambassador had replied this was probably not Nasser but Western oil companies. The Shah characterized this observation as "utter nonsense". He seemed to be very pleased that he had had an opportunity of speaking thus to Soviet Ambassador.

GP-3

18/mfu

HOLMES

AMB:JCHolmes:eob
x-2100
5/5/64

CONFIDENTIAL (Classification)

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "OFFICIAL USE ONLY" OR "UNCLASSIFIED"

ORIGIN/ACTION

INR/B-10

RM/R	REP	AF	ARA
1		5	5
EUR	FE	NEA	CU
6	6	10	3
INR	E	P	IO
5		1	3
	FOD	AID	
		20	OCT
			USUN
		21	1
AGR	COM	FRB	INT
LAB	TAR	TR	XMB
AIR	ARMY	NAVY	OSD
5	3	4	31
USIA	NSA	CIA	
10	3		

SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION

STATE TELEGRAM

Original to be Filed in _____ Decentralized Files.

FILE DESIGNATION

POL 6
XR POL 17-8 US
XR INT 6

SECRET

HANDLING INDICATOR

CA-9179, NO.

TO : All American Diplomatic and Consular Posts

ACTION:
POL -2ey
INFO:
AMB/DCM-1 OIR-1
SA/ECON-1 CRU-1
FROM jte

CIRC

DATE:

MAR 15 2 14 PM '66

1966 MAR 15 PM 2 01

COPY FLO-PBR

SUBJECT : Biographic Reporting on Soviet Bloc Officials

REF : CA-140, July 7, 1960; CA-4695, October 29, 1963; CA-1471, August 6, 1964; CA-10566, April 7, 1965

The purpose of this Circular is to amplify the instructions contained in the references by re-emphasizing the importance of collecting and reporting biographic information on Soviet Bloc officials.

Various previous instructions have stressed the value of contact with Soviet Bloc officials. It is reiterated that such contact by officers of field posts, if conducted on a selective basis, duly reported and centrally controlled by the field post, can be a productive source of important information. In addition to serving as a source of information in the political, economic, military and other related fields, it is particularly important that such contacts be exploited fully for the opportunities which they offer for collecting biographic information on Bloc officials, especially because such information, for the most part, is not routinely available through documentary sources. While many of the reports resulting from such contacts which have been submitted in the past have contained useful biographic information, many officers tend to confine their reporting to the substance of their conversations and neglect to include biographic items which may have emerged during the course of the contact. Basic biographic

GROUP 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
19
TEHRAN

POST ROUTING

TO:	Action	Info.	Initials
AMB/PO			
DCM			
POL			
ECON			
CONS			
COM			
AID			
USIS			
FILE			

Action Taken:

Date:
Initials:

FORM DS-323

SECRET

For Department Use Only
In Out

Drafted by: INR/CS/BR:B.P.Finke:ae
Drafting Date: 3/2/66
Phone No.: 7997
Contents and Classification Approved by: INR/D/DDC: Mr. William McAfee

Clearances: AF/EX- Mr. Dobyns EUR/EX- Mr. Irving FE/EX - Mr. Trueworthy
NEA/EX- Mr. Hallman CU/EX-Mr. Hall IO/EX-Mr. Nielson
ARA/LA-Mr. Sayre

SECRET

information of interest includes such items as date and place of birth, apparent age, physical description, childhood home and environment, family and education, and influential associates. In addition, the reporting officer's observations on the personality of the Soviet Bloc interlocutor, interests which he manifests or specific talents or idiosyncrasies which he betrays are of particular interest. Accordingly, it is requested that special efforts be made to include such information in future reporting whenever feasible. If contact with the same individual is continued over a period of time the reporting officer should prepare a personality assessment based on his accumulated impressions of the Bloc official

RUSK

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Victor J. OSIPOV, Second Secretary, Soviet Embassy, Tehran; Walter G. RAmsay, Second Secretary, American Embassy

Place: American Embassy, Tehran

Date: April 9, 1966

Mr. Osipov called on me at his request. I last met him, briefly, at the Hungarian Embassy National Day reception on April 4, he then asked for an appointment to see me to reciprocate my call on him at the Soviet Embassy on February 12. Our conversation lasted 50 minutes and was entirely in Persian. The following points were covered:

1. After the usual amenities, I explained to Osipov that I was receiving him in an unused office (Chancery Room 105) because we unfortunately do not have a regular reception room. This let into a few minutes discussion of the relative architectural merits of the Soviet Embassy, built along older, sumptuous lines, and the more starkly modern American Embassy. Osipov asked if I had ever visited the Soviet "Club". After an involved conversation to establish just what club he was talking about (the Club for Soviet Embassy personnel on Avenue Stalin), I said I had been there once about a year ago to see a Polish Embassy film show. Osipov then asked if I would like to visit the club sometime. I did not respond to this invitation and he did not pursue the subject.

2. 23rd Communist Party Congress. I asked if Ambassador Zaitsev had returned to Tehran and said I assumed he was a delegate to the 23rd Communist Party Congress in Moscow. Osipov confirmed that their Ambassador was a delegate to the Congress and said he would not return for several more days, as he would stay on in Moscow for discussions of economic questions, etc. I expressed mild surprise, since the Congress had terminated the previous day. Osipov explained that "discussions" among delegates to the Congress would nevertheless continue for a few days, that they would concentrate principally on economic questions, but would not be restricted to questions of Soviet internal affairs.

CONFIDENTIAL

Osipov referred to Secretary-General Brezhnev's speech to the Congress, which contained "suggestions" to the United States concerning the necessary steps to take to relax tensions in several areas: Europe, Latin America, nuclear armaments and Viet Nam. I asked Osipov the significance of Brezhnev's new title of Director-General of the Politburo. He said the change in title was completely routine and had no significance. Osipov then launched into a discourse on Viet Nam and the need to effect a settlement. He said:

a. The U.S. must negotiate with the Democratic Government of Viet Nam (Dowlat-e-democraci-ye-Viet Nam) on the basis of the latter government's "4 Points".

b. The U.S. must withdraw all its forces from Viet Nam, and

c. The Vietnamese people must be permitted to solve their own problems without interference from any outside forces.

Osipov then added the personal observation that the best means of reaching a settlement might be through a Geneva conference.

I asked Osipov where he thought the armed personnel of the Viet Cong came from. He replied, "the people of South Viet Nam". When I pointed out that we have a wealth of evidence that the Viet Cong are in large measure recruited and trained in North Viet Nam and that the VC forces are supplied, supported and directed from North Viet Nam, and that consequently VC activities are an obvious interference in the affairs of South Viet Nam, Osipov did not reply directly. He shifted to the question of US bombardment of North Viet Nam. He reminded me that the USSR was committed to helping all "socialist countries struggling for their independence", and this included Viet Nam. US bombardment of North Viet Nam raised the danger of escalation of the conflict and the danger of a confrontation between US and Soviet forces. Fortunately, he said, US and Soviet troops have not been opposing each other directly thus far and it would be better to keep it this way. He then said the chief reason the US is still fighting in Viet Nam is to preserve its "prestige" (he used the English word), while in truth US prestige would be enhanced if we were to withdraw from Viet Nam.

I told Osipov that he was making a serious mistake to think that the US is involved in Viet Nam only to gain or protect its prestige. While it is certainly true that the US must honor its

pledge to help South Viet Nam maintain its independence, in order to demonstrate that our future commitments will also be honored, of equal importance are:

a. Our determination that the Viet Cong not be permitted to impose a settlement on Viet Nam through force.

b. That all of Viet Nam not fall within the Communist Chinese sphere-of-influence.

In regard to American bombardment of North Viet Nam, I reminded Osipov that we had ceased the bombardment for 39 days and made great efforts to open up avenues of discussion of the Viet Nam problem. We had not detected the slightest interest on the part of North Viet Nam in peaceful negotiations. Consequently, it served no useful purpose to lecture the US on the need to negotiate. Our readiness to negotiate is a matter of record.

Osipov again commented at length on the dangers of escalation and, in this context, asked if I was familiar with the speech Marshall Malinovsky made before the 23rd Party Congress. When I said I was not familiar with the speech, Osipov described it as a summary of Soviet capabilities and readiness in all fields of military technology.

Just to change the subject, I asked Osipov if Reza Radmaneah had been a delegate of the Iranian Tudeh party at the Congress. He laughingly replied that he was, but said he had not delivered any speeches to the assembly. He added that the Congress was a meeting of political parties, not governments, hence it was quite logical that the Iranian Tudeh party should be represented.

Osipov immediately commenced a monologue on the development of the Soviet economy and increases in Soviet industrial strength. Since the beginning of the first five-year plan in 1928, Soviet steel production had risen from 12 million to 81 million tons last year, oil production had reached 250 million tons, etc. While the Soviet GNP (?) was increasing at a rate of 8 to 10 per cent annually, the US GNP was rising at a rate of only 2 per cent per annum. I corrected him on the latter figure.

I again interrupted and suggested that since we both were in Iran it would be interesting to talk about Iran. I asked if, in view of the Soviet Union's new relaxed and friendly relations with Iran, the Soviet government had any intention of suggesting to the Iranians, or requesting them, to relax the restrictions

placed on the Tudeh party. Osipov replied, "No." I tehn asked how the Soviet people felt about their government extending economic aid to a monarchial government that outlawed its own domestic communist party. He replied that the Soviet people are quite pleased with their country's good relations with Iran, which is making such good progress under the Shah's leadership. He pointed out that although both Iran and Afghanistan are monarchies, the USSR is pleased to extend economic aid to them. His government would not speak out on behalf of the Iranian Tudeh Party because 1) the Soviet Union's relations with Iran were concerned with political and economic relations, and not with ideological questions and 2) the Shah would not tolerate the Tudeh party anyway, nor any other political party for that matter, so what would be the use.

On departing, Osipov said he hoped we could get together again soon to continue our discussions, which he considered a useful exchange of views. He said he might be going to Kerman for a short visit within the next few days, so perhaps we could meet after he returned. He then corrected himself to say he would be taking a trip "outside of Tehran". He also asked me if I could send him some cancelled postage stamps, either American or from other countries, for his son's collection. I told him I would try to do so. I was completely non-committal regarding further meetings with him.

Comment

In reading the foregoing, due allowance should be made for the difficulties of communication involved. The reporting officer's Russian is not fluent, and Osipov's, although in some areas he has an extensive vocabulary, ranges from bad to unintelligible.

Osipov was determined to state his, the Soviet, position on Viet Nam, and if I had gone along with him the entire conversation probably would have been restricted to this subject. He was never belligerent or unpleasant in stating his views, however, and discussed all the points listed above in complete good humor.

I do not think Osipov attached any great importance to impressing me with his recital on the Viet Nam question. I suspect his primary interest was to make the call on me and develop his "contact" and that, having arranged the appointment, he decided that a discourse on Viet Nam was one good way of guiding the conversation and steering away from any topics he might find it awkward to discuss.

PROTO:WGRamsay:ap 4/12/66
cc: DCM/POL; Cons - Mr. Haig ; CRU; WGR Chron

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

Intelligence Information Cable

USSR

FIELD REPORT NO. NIT-7084

COUNTRY IRAN USSR

DATE OF INFO. 9 APRIL 1966

DIST. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR

SUBJECT

EXPULSION OF THREE SOVIET DIPLOMATS FROM IRAN

PLACE & DATE ACQ. IRAN, TEHRAN (12 APRIL 1966)

REF XXXX

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: AN OFFICIAL IRANIAN SERVICE.

1. ON 9 APRIL 1966 THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY ORGANIZATION (SAVAK) ARRESTED FIKRAT ISFENDIYAR OGLY EFENDIYEV, ATTACHE IN THE SOVIET CONSULATE IN TEHRAN, AT A CLANDESTINE MEETING WITH AN IRANIAN AGENT WHO WAS AN IRANIAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE. SAVAK TOOK EFENDIYEV TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY WHERE OFFICERS FORCIBLY SEARCHED HIM. THEY FOUND HE WAS CARRYING 15,000 RIALS AND THREE SOVIET PASSPORTS ISSUED IN THE NAMES OF THE AGENT AND HIS FAMILY. THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SUMMONED SOVIET CHARGE D'AFFAIRES PAVEL PETROVICH ZOTOV, DECLARED EFENDIYEV PERSONA NON GRATA AND SAID HE MUST LEAVE IRAN. IT PLANS TO SEND ALSO SENT A NOTE TO THE SOVIET EMBASSY ASKING THAT FIRST SECRETARY VIKTOR NIKOLAYEVICH SPOLNIKOV AND THIRD SECRETARY ISMAIL MURTUZA OGLY ALIYEV LEAVE IRAN BECAUSE OF THEIR EARLIER

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

NO FOREIGN DISSEM
DISSEM CONTROLS

implication IN THE SAME CASE. EFENDIYEV APPLIED FOR HIS EXIT PERMIT ON 12 APRIL. (FIELD COMMENT: EFENDIYEV, SPOLNIKOV AND ALIYEV ARE ALL KGB OFFICERS. ZOTOV IS A GRU OFFICER.)

2. SAVAK HAS BEEN CLOSELY MONITORING THE CASE SINCE 1962 WHEN SPOLNIKOV FIRST MET AND BEGAN TO DEVELOP THIS AGENT. HE WAS TURNED OVER TO ALIYEV IN 1964, THEN TO EFENDIYEV IN MID-1965 AT WHICH TIME HE WAS FORMALLY RECRUITED TO PROVIDE SECURITY INFORMATION, PRINCIPALLY ON SAVAK. ON SAVAK'S INSTRUCTIONS, HE GAVE THE SOVIETS CAREFULLY CONTROLLED INFORMATION UNTIL THE IRANIAN AUTHORITIES, WITH THE SHAH'S APPROVAL, DECIDED TO TERMINATE THE CASE AND MADE THE ARREST AS DESCRIBED ABOVE. THE 15,000 RIALS FOUND ON EFENDIYEV WAS TO BE A PAYMENT TO THE AGENT. THE PASSPORTS HAD BEEN PREPARED AT HIS REQUEST TO PROVIDE PROTECTION IF HE SHOULD BE DISCOVERED BY SAVAK.

3. THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAS DIRECTED THE IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW, AHMAD MIRFENDERESKI, TO SEND A FORMAL NOTE OF PROTEST TO THE SOVIET MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ABOUT THIS CASE.

4. (FIELD COMMENT: IT IS NOT YET KNOWN IF THE EXPULSION OF THE THREE SOVIETS WILL BE PUBLICIZED. NEMATOLLAH NASIRI, CHIEF OF SAVAK, FAVORS PUBLISHING THE CASE AND WILL PROBABLY SO RECOMMEND TO THE SHAH ON 14 APRIL.)

5. FIELD ... : STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCUSNAVEUR CINCMEAFSA CINCSOUTH (PERSONAL). ALSO SENT LONDON.

S E C R E T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FIELD REPORT

SOURCE A: Completely reliable. B: Usually reliable. C: Fairly reliable. D: Not usually reliable. E: Not reliable. (Applied to sources of unusual honesty and loyalty, regardless of their competence.) F: Reliability cannot be judged (Applied to untried or insufficiently tested sources).

CONTENT 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true. 3: Possibly true. 4: Doubtful. 5: Probably false. 6: Cannot be judged.

S E C R E T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY IRAN USSR

SUBJECT OFFICIAL CONCERN OVER SOVIET ORAL PROPAGANDA IN IRAN

REPORT NO. USSR 66

DATE OF REPORT 16 APRIL 1966

NO. PAGES

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. MARCH - APRIL 1966

PLACE & DATE ACQ. IRAN, TEHRAN 14 APRIL 1966

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE AND CONTENT ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

NIT-7086

SOURCE AN OFFICIAL IRANIAN SERVICE.

1. SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY ORGANIZATION /SAVAK/ ARE CONCERNED BY SOVIET OFFICIALS' RECENT SPREADING OF UNFOUNDED RUMORS AND PROPAGANDA AMONG VARIOUS LEVELS OF TEHRAN SOCIETY. THEY FEEL IT IS A CONCERTED CAMPAIGN BY THE SOVIETS TO SOW SUSPICION AND DISCORD IN THE MINDS OF THE IRANIAN PEOPLE IN AN EFFORT TO WORSEN IRANIAN-WESTERN RELATIONS.

2. TWO OF THE MOST ACTIVE SOVIET OFFICIALS IN THIS CAMPAIGN ARE FEDOR ALEKSEYEVICH SAULCHENKOV, COUNSELOR OF EMBASSY, AND SECOND SECRETARY VIKTOR YAKOVLEVICH OSIPOV. THEY HAVE BEEN CONCENTRATING ON TWO SUBJECTS -

A. CENTO TODAY IS USELESS AND IRAN SHOULD ABANDON IT. THEY CITE THE FACT THAT CENTO GAVE PAKISTAN NO ASSISTANCE WHATSOEVER DURING THE INDO-PAKISTANI WAR.

B. THERE IS A GREAT DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE NIOC AND THE OIL CONSORTIUM, AND THE CONSORTIUM IS NOT GOING TO INCREASE THE PRODUCTION OF PETROLEUM AS THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT HAS REQUESTED. IRAN'S AGREEMENT WITH THE CONSORTIUM IS NO GOOD, THEREFORE, SINCE ONLY THE CONSORTIUM AND WESTERN OIL COMPANIES BENEFIT FROM SUCH AN AGREEMENT.

3. /FIELD COMMENT - SAULCHENKOV IS KNOWN TO BE A SOVIET INTELLIGENCE OFFICER AND OSIPOV IS SUSPECTED OF BEING A KGB OFFICER./

/END/

S E C R E T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

DISTRIBUTION STATE ARMY NAVY AIR

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Grant VOSKANIAN, First Secretary, Soviet Embassy

Place : Residence of Mr. Y. SAHNI, First Secretary, Indian Embassy

Date : April 19, 1966

During a thirty-minute conversation Voskanian made the following comments, to which I made appropriate replies but which are omitted for brevity:

1. Iran: While the USSR is gearing up to provide economic and other useful aid to Iran, the U.S. remains primarily concerned with supplying military hardware such as the F-5s.

2. CENTO: This so-called alliance is on its death bed and Voskanian gives it at most two years to expire. "After all, the Iranians are now convinced that there is no danger of attack from the Soviet Union." (He kept prodding and prying to get me to say what had gone on at the recent CENTO Military Committee Meeting in Tehran as well as what might be the main issues at the Ministerial Conference in Turkey. I merely jokingly replied that all these matters were "Secret" and certainly he would understand that I could not discuss them with him. He gave up after a while.)

3. Islamic Pact: On this he expounded the Soviet line and I replied that I did not consider that an alliance had been contemplated but only a summit meeting. I thought that the Communist propaganda attacks had actually given a lot of free publicity to the summit idea and may have even prompted thoughts about possibilities of an Islamic Pact on the part of those who may not have even thought of such aspects. He insisted it was obviously a subtle plot by "you and the British."

4. Vietnam: The U.S. should extricate itself out of this tangle as quickly as possible. The U.S. should not be concerned with its prestige if it should decide to leave Vietnam. "The French left and they have not lost their prestige when they got out, not only from Indo-China but from Algeria and other parts of Africa." The U.S. should not make the mistake of disregarding the USSR's determination to match any escalation of the Vietnam war.

5. Iranian Parliament: He commented that he did not see me in the Majlis or Senate in recent weeks. "I guess there hasn't been much of interest going on." I forget the context, but he also mentioned that it

CONFIDENTIAL
Group 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals.
Not automatically declassified.

doesn't seem to be too profitable to cultivate Majlis deputies. Deputy Abdollah VALA had recently visited the USSR by invitation, along with a few others, but Voskanian said "Vala is certainly not a friend of ours. He still attacks us in his paper. (Comment: Vala is a member of the Mardom Party and is also editor of Tehran MOSAVAR.)

6. Other Items: I believe I gave Voskanian a hard time on the parliamentary interpellation (April 12) on Radio Peyke-Iran; on the USSR's handling of its intellectual dissidents (Sinyavsky and Daniel, who, Voskanian said, got what they deserved "as slanderers abroad"); the fact that Russian diplomats are rarely accompanied by their wives.

7. Comment: During half of the conversation we got into a discussion on the philosophy of freedom which was mutually stimulating Voskanian said he was very interested in carrying on this discussion in a more appropriate place. I told him I would be happy to do so at any time and place he wished.

POL:GMRassias:ib

Distribution: NFH/NF
Mr. Maig
USSR (bio file)
CMR (chron)

CONFIDENTIAL

Soviet Ambassador Vladimir Yakovlevich Yerofeyev

In one of a series of Soviet diplomatic changes made in January 1968, Vladimir Yakovlevich Yerofeyev was named USSR Ambassador to Iran, his first foreign assignment since he served as Chief of Mission in Cairo from 1959 until 1965. Formerly a specialist in United Kingdom affairs, Yerofeyev has been involved exclusively with the Middle East since his appointment as Chief of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Middle Eastern Countries Division during 1958. While holding his various positions abroad and in the Foreign Ministry apparatus, he has represented the Soviet Union at numerous international conferences and organizations.

Yerofeyev was born on May 24, 1909 in Moscow and received a higher education at the Moscow Machine Instrument Institute, where he completed three courses in 1938. After serving as Deputy Chief and then Chief of the Consular Affairs Division of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in 1939 and 1940, he became Counselor at the Soviet Embassy in Turkey from 1940 to 1942. In that year he was appointed Deputy Chief of the Second European Division (United Kingdom and British Commonwealth) of the Foreign Ministry and held that position until 1948. For a brief period from 1948 to 1949, he served as Chief of the MFA's Latin American Countries Division.

During a tour as Counselor at the Soviet Embassy in London from 1949 to 1952, Yerofeyev acted on at least one occasion as Charge d'Affaires in the absence of the Soviet Ambassador. In August 1952 his appointment as Soviet Minister to Uruguay created internal political opposition in that country. It was alleged that he was not a career diplomat but had been appointed to foment agitation and propaganda. He never assumed the post. He was subsequently assigned as Minister Counselor for Cultural Affairs at the Soviet Embassy in Paris from January 1954 to early 1955. In August 1955 he was named Chief of the Second European Division, a post which he held until late 1958, when he was first identified as Chief of the MFA's Near East Division.

Yerofeyev has frequently been assigned to international conferences. He was an advisor at the Paris Peace Conference from May to August 1946 and from October to December of the same year was an advisor with the Soviet delegation at the First Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). In March of the following year he attended the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Moscow as deputy general secretary of the Soviet delegation and also participated in the London Foreign Ministers Conference in November and December 1947. In September 1948 he headed the Soviet delegation to the Third Session of the UNGA, which was held in Paris. Yerofeyev was secretary of the USSR representation at the Big Four Foreign Ministers Conference in Berlin in early 1954 and during July 1955 was present at the Summit Conference in Geneva in a similar capacity. He also attended the Foreign Ministers Conference in Geneva later that year. He was the USSR's permanent delegate to the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1955.

Yerofeyev's most noteworthy assignment to date has been as Ambassador to the United Arab Republic. (During part of that time, August 1959 to July 1962,

he served concurrently as Chief of Mission in Yemen.) During his tour in Cairo, Yerofeyev was obliged to walk a thin line between Soviet opposition to the UAR's Arab unity plans and mild support of the UAR's brand of socialism. While the USSR extended no new economic credits after the 1960 accord on the second stage of the Aswan Dam, Soviet military aid to Cairo continued and increased sharply following the UAR's intervention in Yemen in 1963. Yerofeyev was relieved of his post in June 1965, presumably to return to the MFA apparatus, although there has been no record of his activities from that date until his recent assignment.

Yerofeyev and his wife, Tamara Ivanovna, have two daughters, one born about 1940 and the other in 1954. One of these, Oksana, accompanied her parents to Cairo. Yerofeyev speaks excellent English and some French. He is of medium stature and has dark, thinning hair and blue eyes. In 1945 he received the Order of Labor Red Banner for wartime services to the Soviet state.

~~Pol~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Bao file

Tehran, Iran

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

February 12, 1970

Subject: Progress of Soviet Economic Projects in Iran

Participants: Gennadi Smolnikov, Counselor of the Embassy of the USSR
Nicholas G. Thacher, Deputy Chief of Mission
William W. Luhfeldt, Counselor of Embassy for Economic Affairs

Copies to: AMB, POL, ECON, CR; NEA/IRN, INR/RAA, INR/RSE; Amembassy Ankara, Amembassy Beirut, Amembassy Kabul, Amembassy Moscow, Amembassy Rawalpindi

Mr. Smolnikov, who was paying a courtesy call, arrived in Tehran about a month ago to take over, as he described it, the economic affairs "in general" of the Soviet Embassy. He explained that his responsibilities were largely the political aspects of economic matters since the Soviets have in Tehran an economic mission located physically outside the embassy and that this mission has to do with general supervision of such matters as construction of the steel mill, Aras Dam project, and the other Soviet economic programs in Iran. Mr. Smolnikov said he had served in Iran before, in the early '50's and also in the Soviet Embassy in Bangkok, where he was shortly before coming to Tehran. He also served in Afghanistan in the late 'fifties.

Mr. Thacher inquired as to the general progress of the major Soviet projects in Iran. Mr. Smolnikov expressed himself as being satisfied while admitting that he had not yet had time to visit any of them on the spot. Two problems, however, are a constant headache to the Russians: One is Iranian slowness in finding the rials with which to keep up those parts of the projects for whose direct costs they are responsible, and the difficulty of finding trained Iranians and of developing the training that is needed for the technical specialists to operate the projects. When asked if the Soviets plan to solve the training problem by sending more Iranians for training in Russia, Smolnikov said there were very few Iranians in training in the USSR now and that he did not expect there would be many more. Without much conviction, Smolnikov said he thought the steel mill would be completed "on time". When the gas pipeline was mentioned, he brightened considerably and affirmed vigorously that things were going well on the Soviet part of that project and that it certainly would be completed on schedule. Difficulties in construction of the portion of the line constructed by the Iranians had stemmed from "excessive cost" of some of the materials received from Western sources.

Smolnikov inquired about U.S. Government economic activities in Iran and was told that we had an Economic Section in the Embassy which also handles commercial matters but that we no longer had a large separate economic organization and that this had been phased out over two years ago with the closing of our AID Mission. USG economic assistance to Iran was now almost entirely in the form of loans from the Export-Import Bank of Washington.

COMMENT: It is worth noting that this is the second senior officer of the Soviet Embassy who has made a courtesy call on the Minister-Counselor within the last three months, the Soviet DCM having called in mid November 1969. Otherwise there had been no such calls in the previous four years.

Smolnikov's English is quite serviceable. He appears to communicate more naturally and easily with foreigners than many Soviet officials. In such a brief interview, it was difficult to judge his intelligence. Nothing he said reflected any unusual perceptiveness. He is short with graying blond hair, many visible gold teeth, a very pale complexion, and a pleasant expression. Toward the end of the interview he asked a general rhetorical question: "Why do the Soviet Union and the United States seem to go along for a while on parallel and cooperative paths and then suddenly diverge sharply with renewed disagreements and difficulties?" A beginning answer by Mr. Thacher was diverted by reference to other topics but, on leaving, Smolnikov promised jokingly that he wished to bring this up with us again in the near future.

DCM:NThacher:mcgw

DRT
CWM
JHR
ALR
APD
GWP
GS

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Tehran, Iran
August 20, 1970

PARTICIPANTS: H.E. Vladimir Erofeev, Ambassador of USSR
Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II

COPIES TO: DCM
POL
ECON
CRU (2)
NEA/IRN
EUR/SOV
Amembassy MOSCOW

Soviet Ambassador Erofeev called on me today to, in his words, "repay the call you made on me when you arrived in Tehran before I return to the Soviet Union for 45 days home leave." Although Erofeev has the reputation of being a hard-liner in negotiations and discussions with senior Iranian officials and Cabinet members, he was affability itself.

He first asked if I had any confirmation of newspaper reports that there would be a Big Four summit meeting in New York in connection with the 25th anniversary of the UN. I replied that I knew nothing of any such meeting other than rumors and reports in the press. He said the same was true with him and that in the Soviet Union such matters were held extremely confidential until formal public announcement was made. Referring to a Big Four meeting, he recalled the origins and establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers in 1945, observing that it had been the Soviet Union which had objected to the participation of Chiang Kai-shek's representative in the Council's deliberations in London. "Now," Erofeev commented with a smile, "we have as many problems with Mao Tse-tung as we had with Chiang Kai-shek."

We then exchanged views on different parts of Iran he had visited. I mentioned that in June I had traveled rather extensively in East and West Azerbaijan and said I assumed Erofeev knew the area well. He said that he had only spent two days in Tabriz and had not traveled elsewhere in Azerbaijan because, as he put it, "we are not very popular in that part of Iran" (an obvious reference to the Soviet effort to install a puppet Azerbaijan socialist republic in 1946).

Erofeev said he would return to Iran about mid-October to participate in the official ceremonies in connection with the opening of the natural gas pipeline from Iran to the Soviet Union. He said while gas might actually start flowing sometime in September, Dr. Eghbal (head of NIOC) had assured him that the ceremonies would take place in October. He then spent sometime talking about the technical

difficulties in the link-up of the pipelines and the problem of compatibility of certain equipment supplied by the Soviets on its side of the frontier with equipment provided by western sources on the Iranian side.

Erofeev also referred to problems that seemed to be universal throughout the world, such as the revolt of young people and alcoholism. The problem with young people today, he thought, was that they had not been brought up under as strict discipline as their forebears and were, therefore, more inclined to protest and create problems. He mentioned that whereas in the western world there seemed to be a very severe problem of drugs, this was not true in the Soviet Union. However, the Soviets had their own problem insofar as alcoholic consumption was concerned, and there had been an increasing tendency on the part of workers in the Soviet Union to get drunk with consequent absenteeism and poor performance.

DMacArthur

AMB:DMacArthur:mm

CONFIDENTIAL

Worth keeping in our Iran - Soviet file and Brz file

29 October 1970

P-Memo #63-70

MEMORANDUM FOR: Political Section

FROM : CAS

SUBJECT : Remarks of the Press Attache of the Soviet Embassy, Syroyezhkin, on Iran-Soviet relations

The following information from a reliable source is for your information and use and need not be attributed to CAS:

The Press Attache of the Soviet Embassy, Syroyezhkin, commented on relations between Iran and the Soviet Union. He strongly criticized the propaganda policies of the Iranian Government and said: The Iranian Ministry of Information is actually a branch of the U.S. Information Section, and the general lines of the propaganda policies of that ministry are being designed by Iranian officials working at the USIS. News items connected with the Soviet Union and neutral countries are being published and broadcast in a pungent and malicious way, whereas the news dealing with the U.S. and Western countries are made public with "special decorations".

Syroyezhkin noted that recently an anti-Communist conference was held in Tokyo in which Iran was represented by Rahim Zehtab Fard, the editor of Eradeyeh Azarbaijan, and another person. The Ettela'at newspaper had published the statements made by Fidel Castro's sister at the conference in which she had impudently attacked Communism. One cannot, he continued, understand the purpose of Iranian newspapers when they publish such provocative items--except to think that it is part of the work accomplished by American saboteurs who pay money to Iranian newspapers to have such articles and items published.

Syroyezhkin then mentioned the publication of a book on the situation of Iranian villages. But the book was banned and the author arrested. Another well-known writer, whose pen name is Beh-Azin and real name is Mahmud E'temad-zadeh, had in an article highly commended the author's work, confirming its contents. He, too, was arrested.

On a more positive note, Syroyezhkin noted the visit to Iran by the Chairman of the Soviet State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, Skachkov and the conclusion of the 15-year technical and economic cooperation agreement between Iran and the Soviet Union. Syroyezhkin said that prospects of expansion of relations between the two countries seemed quite brilliant and promising and concluded that "even we couldn't expect to achieve such a success on the economic stage of Iran".

Tehran A-
Enclosure No. 3

CONFIDENTIAL

CHARGE: Mr. Heck
[illegible]: Mr. McCaskill: for Bio
ECON: Mr. Malla
SAI STAccudaro

April 20, 1972

Discussion with Soviet 1st Secretary Vladimir Vlassov

1. Soviet Youth & Drugs: Vlassov's wife is to leave for the USSR at the end of May in order to oversee the entry of his children into the university system in Moscow. I asked if he wasn't worried that his children might get involved with drugs or with some kind of radical political practices when left so far from home and parents. He replied that, though they were staying with their grandparents, he was somewhat worried about them as any parent would be. He stated that only a small minority of Soviet students were involved with drugs and that this did not bother him as the possibility that it would happen to his children is remote indeed. However, he is somewhat concerned that his children will pick up "strange ideas" at college and noted that while he is "not a puritan" he would not want his offspring exposed to "bad ideas".

2. Russia in the Gulf: Vlassov was quite concerned with the effect of the recent Iran-Iraqi treaty on Iran and the Iranian perception of Soviet aims in the Gulf. He said that his Ambassador had called on Fonmin Khalatbari before the recent Iran/Iraq border flare-up to explain that the treaty was in no way directed toward Iran and that the USSR desired that the two nations settle their differences peacefully. The FonMin received the news "without enthusiasm" and complained that the Iraqis, even in the Foreign Ministry seek to restrict the range of the contacts of Soviet Embassy officers (he has complained about this before). He noted that he has been in Tehran for three months now and has only met the chief of the FonMin section which has responsibility for the USSR and Bloc countries. He asked again if we have a similar problem and I fear I gloated a bit when I told him that we know literally hordes of Iranian officials and often trade invitations to one another's homes.

He noted that the recent executions of Iranian Leftists were in large measure fraudulent and comment that he considered them a response to the Soviets and the Iraqis and that the Soviets are resigned to the ideological gulf existing between Iran and the USSR. However, he feels that the Iranians may one day turn toward the Soviets and away from the West and asked what I thought of the chances that that would happen. I said that, in my opinion, the Iranians were well aware of the long history of Soviet ambitions in the Gulf region and touched on some examples for him beginning with Peter the Great. (he seemed not to know about the clauses in the treaty with Hitler's Germany). Vlassova admitted that I had a point and changed the subject.

He then asked again for the second time, if I did not think that Iran's military might not one day disturb the peace of the Gulf and I responded once again that I thought that they were more likely to cooperate in the face of the common enemy, Iraq. He also asked if the visit of President Nixon to Iran while not visiting Saudi Arabia might not exacerbate any existing disputes between the two nations. I replied that I saw no reason why it should as the President was merely keeping a promise he had made long ago to repay the Shah's visits to the US. He also asked if the visit would be for protocol purposes or if matters of import would be discussed and I responded that I had no idea what the agenda would be but that any matter of mutual interest would be suitable for discussion between two heads of state.

Vlassov then asked if there was not a limit to the degree of Soviet penetration that we would allow in the Gulf region and wondered where we would draw the line. I said that it would be foolish of me to suggest that we were not interested in Soviet penetration into so vital an area but that the relations of the Gulf nations with the USSR or any other country was their own business and I did not see how we could interfere. He did not believe me.

Vietnam: He asked what I thought of the present situation in Vietnam and I replied that it was a shame that the North Vietnamese had invaded because we and the South Vietnamese were now finding it necessary to kill them in great numbers and it was resulting in considerable damage to the North as well. He opined that the invaders were really VC but I shot that down and then he wondered what would be necessary to get us back to the negotiating table. He said that, should negotiations resume, it would be better to discuss concrete issues one by one, rather than to trade accusations of agression. He then asked how the American people felt about the renewed bombing of the North and I responded by also asking how the Russian people felt about Czechoslovakia in 1968. He replied that, except for a small minority, they all supported the move. Then he opined that the timing of the US assault was "a mistake -- no, not a mistake but perhaps a miscalculation" in that they Red Army should have entered Czechoslovakia before things went so far.

Commissary: Vlassov asked me about me credit cards and, after explaining how they work and about catalogue ordering, I asked if he had the same benefits. He replied that things are sold on credit in individual Russian stores but that such facilitites are not granted outside the Soviet Union. The Soviets in Tehran have no commissary; items are flown in from Moscow at intervals and then they are sold to members of the Embassy. I told him about our commissary and (as per Malla's suggestion) offered to supply him with commissary items or things ordered from the US if he should ever be in need. He did not appear especially interested.

Personal:

Vlassov has a new car; a Dodje Dart, white with blue interior. He likes the car but has not yet become used to the automatic transmission.

Vlassov's wife is still having minor problems at the Russian hospital: the volume of work is much greater than s expected and she gets all kinds of cases without the pa having received prior consultation on their illnesses. In t USSR she, as a neurologist, only saw patients after they ha visited a general practitioner and had had their cases diag Moreover, their work weeks are different and thus they have dif days off so that they only see each other in the evenings.

We will next meet May 4 at my apartment for dinner. Vlassov wants his wife to accompany him but as she only speaks Russian and French (the latter not very well) he hoped that she and my wife would be able to get on. My wife speaks French rather poorly and Farsi rather well so I suggested that I might invite someone else whose wife is fluent in either French or Russian.

The above meeting took place at the Chinese restaurant off of Pahlavi near Aryamehr. It cost Vlassov 1055 rials. He is not a heavy tipper; he left 20 rials.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Halla, NCON
CC: Mr. Toussaint, POL

DATE: June 13, 1972

FROM : Stan Escudero, POL

SUBJECT: Conversation with Soviet First Secretary Vladimir Vlassov

It seemed that Vlassov was making an extra attempt to be charming today. He made a big show of asking me to call him Vladimir and asking if he could call me Stan. Later he repeated an effusive invitation to visit him in his quarters in the Russian summer compound after my return from Baluchistan.

In our conversation, which was wide ranging, he seemed to concentrate on three main subjects: President Nixon's visit, the Shah's forthcoming trip to Great Britain, and the interrelationships of the Gulf states.

Concerning the former, Vlassov asked directly if Iran had asked for a new loan of some sort while Nixon was here and if the question of additional military aid or sales to Iran was discussed. He also wondered if the meetings between Nixon and HIM took place in the presence of advisors or if they were completely private. I pled ignorance on all of these questions. Vlassov (and by implication the Soviets in general) suspects that one of the purposes of the President's recent visit was to cement a kind of informal arrangement whereby it would be agreed between the US, Britain and Iran that Iran would insure the stability of the Persian Gulf area while the US and UK would jointly guarantee the defense of the Indian Ocean and specifically the approaches to the Gulf. This, I feels, is one of the major reasons why the Shah is going to Britain in the near future. He reasons that there could be few economic questions for them to discuss other than the Iraqi position on the two countries' positions on the Iraqi nationalization of IPC properties and that, were there not some important political reason for the trip, the Shah would not now visit Britain in the wake of critical articles such as those which recently appeared in the Economist and the Financial Times.

I replied that I thought the Shah and his government drew distinctions between the statements of a Western government and its press but that, in any case, I had heard nothing of any such agreement and, given the present political climate in the United States, I personally doubted that there was much chance that any such agreement would be tolerated by Congress. Still, I asked, just supposing that some such agreement was reached, what would be the position of the Soviet Union?

Vlassov responded that the USSR would prefer that any agreement concerning the security of the Persian Gulf be made between all of its littoral states specifically including Iraq. I replied that, practically speaking, this would be difficult to arrange. He agreed but noted that such a regional collective security organization would fit with Brezhnev's announced preference for an Asian collective security organization in that similar smaller groups could perhaps be formed in south Asia and southeast Asia and they could perhaps later be joined together into one. Vlassov went on to note that Secretary Rogers' remarks after the CENTO meeting indicated that the US plans to build up its presence in the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area. He views this as support for his thesis of three-power collusion in the region. I rejoined that the Secretary was not speaking of an increase in power levels but merely the substitution

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

of newer vessels for old ones and the completion of other ongoing activities. No new inputs are planned to my knowledge.

Vlassov then asked what I thought was the Iranian position on the Iraqi nationalization of IPC . I commented that, as OPEC supported the Iraqis, I could only presume that Iran, as an OPEC member, did so also. He agreed that this is true in public but didn't I think that the Iranians would increase their offtake in order to take advantage of the hole in the market left by the withdrawal of Iraqi supplies. I responded that oil was not my area of expertise but that I wondered if the technical problems involved in increasing one's oil offtake in large amounts could be overcome in time to permit the Iranians to fill the Iraqi vacuum immediately even if they wanted to do so. I then asked if he did not agree that the Iraqis had been acting much more fiesty since the two agreements with the USSR. He agreed that this is so. Then I asked if he could supply a copy of the recent commercial agreement between the USSR and Iraq or at least those portions of it which could be published. He replied that he would certainly do so but that, as he had not yet received the papers from Moscow which could be expected to report on such developments, the matter would have to wait until my return from Baluchistan when he hoped to have what I wanted.

Discussing the situation in the UAE, Vlassov commented that the Iranians were certainly dissatisfied with the performance of Shaikh Zayed but he was not sure if they were "doing anything practical" to ensure his replacement. However, he has the impression that the Shaikh of Fujarah would be far more acceptable to the GOI as the leader of the UAE. Concerning the possibility of a socialist revolution in one of the Gulf states, Vlassov noted that the USSR would feel constrained to support ~~xxx~~ the rebels both morally and with material support. Noting that this attitude is one of the reasons why he and his colleagues don't get a better reception in Iran, I asked what would happen if such a revolt should take place in an nation which belonged to one of the collective security organization which he had envisaged, particularly if the organization had, as would be expected, announced that it wanted no great power presence in the area under its aegis. Vlassov replied that he felt it would be better if the question of the internal affairs of the governments of the member states of such an organization were not a matter for discussion among the other members but were left to each individual member state to ~~xxx~~ arrange as it wishes, (in other words, the USSR, faced with such a situation, will do whatever it thinks it can get away with -- ~~x~~reasonable enough but hardly departure~~x~~ -- my comment).

Vlassov will spend the remainder of the summer alone in Tehran and then "in early autumn", will join his wife in Moscow. They plan to vacation in Karlovari (sp?), a mineral water spa in former Czech territory before returning to Iran.

We agreed to meet again on Wednesday, June 28 at the Greek restaurant. You owe me 800 rials for lunch and tip at the Mexican restaurant.

Bio-
Vlassov
USSR

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: October 25, 1972

SUBJECT: Shah's Visit to the USSR
Internal Situation in Russia
Soviet Radio Station in Baku
Developments within Soviet Embassy in Tehran
Bio Data

PARTICIPANTS: V Umir Vlassov, 1st Secretary, Soviet Embassy
[illegible]ley T. Escudero, Embassy Officer

PLACE: Maharajah Restaurant over Lunch

COPIES:

AMB/DCM	OR
NEA/IRN	BIO
INR/RNA	INR/OI 'B
POL (5)	Embassy Moscow
POL/M	

1. Shah's Visit to the USSR

Vlassov confirmed that the subject of Iraq was not raised during the talks between HIM and the Russian leaders. He professed himself surprised that the Shah did not mention the subject but felt that it was perhaps omitted in order to assure the cordial nature of the talks. Certainly, he said, the Soviets were under no obligation to raise the matter. Actually, Vlassov believes that the Shah did not want Russian assistance with the Iraqis as HIM has no wish to be indebted to his great northern neighbor. Iran, Vlassov said, has been playing the role of a powerful nation dealing with the world's great powers as an equal, as witness the imperial visits to the UK, China and the Soviet Union, and Nixon's trip to Iran. A request for Russian help would take away from the image of equality.

Three days were originally scheduled for talks between the leaders but all matters of interest were discussed in the first two days and no talks were held on the third day. The remainder of the imperial stay was devoted to sightseeing.

CONFIDENTIAL

The entire first day was taken up by a description by the Shah of the considerable internal development and progress in Iran but the second day Breshnev suggested that they discuss international subjects of mutual interest. HIM wondered if this meant areas in which their policies differed but Breshnev replied that he merely wanted to discuss international matters of mutual interest. In the course of this phase of the talks both sides agreed that they wanted to normalize the situation in the sub-Continent and that problems pertaining to the region of the Persian Gulf should be settled by the littoral states without interference from outside powers. Vlassov denied that any clarifications of articles 5 and 6 of the 1921 Iran-Soviet Treaty of Friendship were considered. (Comment: We have reliable information to the contrary.)

At the Shah's initiative the 15-year treaty was brought up. Vlassov was surprised that it was signed at this juncture, stating that he would have expected it to receive further study before final agreement. It was also at the Shah's suggestion that the document was called a treaty, as opposed to a lesser sort of agreement, as HIM wanted to be sure that a degree of political importance attached to it.

The Soviets also brought up the subject of Vietnam, concerning which Vlassov said virtually nothing, and the matter of an Asian security conference. The Shah greeted the latter suggestion with the comment that it is a good idea in principle but that the time is not right for it. Moreover, HIM thought that some consideration should be given to specific subjects to be on the agenda before arrangements for the actual conference were seriously discussed.

As for the invitation to Podgorny to visit Iran, Vlassov commented that Podgorny had already been in Iran several times and that too many visits of that sort took away from their overall significance. He suspected that someone other than Podgorny would accept the invitation, perhaps Kosygin. In any case, it would not be Breshnev, as an invitation to the head of the communist party rather than a government official presents certain protocol difficulties.

2. Internal Situation in Russia

After describing the Russian agricultural situation as terrible, Vlassov opined that recent crop failures would not harm Breshnev's position as the most powerful man in the Soviet Union. Unlike Khrushchev, who was also plagued with agricultural failures and bad relations with China, Breshnev has not created a personality cult of the Stalin type. It was the latter mistake that made the principal contribution to Krushchev's downfall and not his agricultural failures.

3. Soviet Radio Station in Baku

Predictably, Vlassov denied that the Soviets have a radio station in Baku which broadcasts propaganda into Iran, noting that such a move would defeat years of careful effort to improve relations with the Iranians. He maintained that, despite the reporting officer's contention that such propaganda facilities use the term "Arabian Gulf", official Russian policy describes that body of water as the "Persian Gulf".

4. Developments Within Soviet Embassy in Tehran

The Assistant Military Attache (unnamed), who lives on the fifth floor of the apartment building in the Russian compound downtown, was just promoted. He and Vlassov are good friends as Vlassov lives just below him.

A new Farsi expert named Kharsarov (?) has just arrived at the Embassy. This will be his third posting in Iran and his Farsi is so good that he used to function as interpreter for Podgorny during his Iranian visits.

None of the Embassies in which Vlassov has served, including the one in Tehran, maintains bio files in the chancellery. Such information is available only by writing back to Moscow where it is stored in the Foreign Ministry or in various research institutes. Vlassov has suggested several times to his Ambassador here that it would be a good idea to start such a practice here and that he would like to model his Embassy's files on the American system. He asked if the reporting officer (who coincidentally happens to be the Embassy's biographic coordinator) could obtain a sanitized file for Vlassov to show to his Ambassador as a sample. Vlassov received a non-commital reply.

5. Bio Data

Vlassov's daughter, as expected, has passed all her university entrance exams with excellent marks. He is now worried about his son, who is not as good a student as his daughter. If the son's marks are not high enough to send him to the university, Vlassov will send him to a factory as a worker for the year between his graduation from high school and his compulsory entry into the armed forces.

His wife has returned from the USSR and is back in Tehran. They have postponed their planned October vacation in the USSR until after the November celebrations but hope to get away at that time. Vlassov makes no secret of his distaste for his Iranian assignment. He noted once again that he is unable to make proper contact with Iranian officials and, now that there have been some changes in the Second Political Division in the MFA, Vlassov will have to start all over again developing what were just about the only contacts he had in the GOI. He claims to have broadened his contacts among the diplomatic corps, however.

He again suggested that the reporting officer visit him in the Soviet Union while on his way to the US for home leave next summer. It was agreed that Vlassov would call after the spate of holidays ending for him on November 7.

POL:STEscudero:paz
October 28, 1972

POL:AIKillgore



CONFIDENTIAL

USSR (VLASSOV BIO)

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Vladimir Vlassov, Soviet First Secretary
Stanley Escudero, Embassy Officer

DATE: April 9, 1973

PLACE: Mexican Restaurant Over Lunch

SUBJECTS:
1. Iranian Arms Build-up
2. Iran/Soviet Relations and Kosygin Visit
3. Relations Between Soviet Embassy and GOI
4. Relations Between US and USSR Embassies
5. Bio Data

REF: A) Escudero-Godfrey Memcon of Feb. 7, 1973
B) Previous Escudero-Vlassov Memcons

DISTRIBUTION:

Amb/DCM	POL/M	INR/OIL/B
NEA/IRN	OR	Amconsul Khorramshahr
INR/RNA	DAO	Amembassy MOSCOW
POL (3)	BIO	Amembassy ISLAMABAD

Amembassy NEW DELHI
Amembassy JIDDA
Amembassy KUWAIT
KUWAIT PASS MUSCAT
USINT BAGHDAD

Iranian Arms Build-up

The principal topic of conversation was Vlassov's anxiety, expressed in terms of strong support for India's position, over the speed and scale of Iran's projected military build-up. In terms very similar to those reportedly used by Indian Charge Prakash Shah (ref. A) Vlassov wondered if Iran was about to play the role of an American Trojan Horse with its belly loaded not with soldiers but with weapons for distribtuion to other area states. Vlassov received the stock answer that recipients of US armaments were not permitted to pass them to a third country without the previous agreement of the USG and he countered with the supposition that such a role for Iran would have not only the agreement but the active encouragement of the United States.

Classified by S.T. Escudero
Subject to General Declassification
Schedule of EO 11652. Automatically
downgraded at two year intervals and
declassified on Dec 31, 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

The plan made sense, he said, because the clandestine supply of arms through Iran, particularly to Pakistan, would enable America to resupply its South Asian ally while still maintaining good relations with India. The reporting officer commented that any US equipment sent to Pakistan now or in the future (and all such equipment is presently non-lethal) would certainly be the result of direct USG/GOP contact and that his plan, though not entirely devoid of logic, is impractical for a number of reasons: We could hardly ask Iran to act in a way which would worsen its relations with India in order to preserve the American-Indian relationship; an arms supply program cannot be concealed and, when India discovered what was going on our relations would suffer anyway; the physical condition of the Iran/Pakistan border being what it is, it would be well nigh impossible to transport large amounts of heavy equipment and supplies from Iran to Pakistan secretly or otherwise; finally, and most importantly, US policy favors peaceful settlements of disputes in the sub-Continent and, under present circumstances, the large scale re-arming of Pakistan would not be likely to contribute to that goal.

Vlassov then turned to the use of Iranian arms in the Persian Gulf, stating that, as both Jidda and Tehran want to be predominant in the Gulf a rivalry between the two seems likely. The Sheikhdoms fear growing Iranian power and, in the same way that a Soviet proposal for an Asian collective security system was widely regarded as a bid for Russian dominance, a similar Iranian proposal for the Gulf littoral states is seen by the Sheikhdoms as an attempt to ensure Iran's paramountcy. However, while the various Emirates and sultanates are wary of the Shah, they distrust King Faisal more, as Saudi Arabia is closer and is perceived as a greater threat. Any untoward moves from Jidda would be likely to push the Sheikhdoms nearer to Iran for support, improving the chances that the small Gulf states will attempt to play off Iran and Saudi Arabia against each other thus exacerbating the "natural contradictions" which exist between the two Gulf giants. Anxiety regarding Saudi and Iranian intentions is so great, he opined, that Kuwait, even when faced with Iraqi military action, did not request help from either state.

The reporting officer replied that any areas of disagreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia are small and can easily be papered over in the event of a serious threat to any Gulf state from such organizations as PFLOAG, the Dhofar Rebels or from Iraq. Moreover, such a threat would be far more likely to call a Persian Gulf security organization into being than any action by either Iran or the Saudis. Therefore, if the Soviets really believed in the existence of the natural contradictions he described, the intelligent thing to do would be to reduce support to subversive organizations and to Iraq and sit back to wait for the inevitable deterioration of relations among the Gulf littoral states. As for the Kuwait-Iraq confrontation,

the virtually universal Arab condemnation of the Iraqi actions and the probability that neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran could afford to permit an Iraqi takeover of Kuwait made a cry for help largely unnecessary.

According to Vlassov the degree of Chinese influence among the guerilla organizations makes it impossible for the Soviets to significantly reduce their support even if they wished to do so. In fact, Chinese influence in the sub-Continent and the Persian Gulf is on the increase, using Pakistan as a point of entry. Vlassov indicated that his government and that of India view this development with concern but Iran seems to be pleased, viewing a Chinese presence as a counterweight to India.

COMMENT: As noted in previous messages, the subject of a possible Saudi-Iranian rivalry in the Gulf is a favorite with Vlassov though he has never discussed a scenario for the development of such a rivalry before. His repeated insistence causes one to wonder if the Soviets actually hope to use the Sheikhdoms as a wedge to split Iran and the Saudis.

2. Iran/Soviet Relations and Kosygin Visit

In answer to a question, Vlassov remarked that Iraq's actions in recent months have had a deleterious effect on Iran/Soviet relations. He wondered if the GOI really believes that Russia is attempting to encircle it using Iraq and India as proxies. When the reporting officer replied that Iranians might very well feel this way, Vlassov opined that the whole thing was started by an article in the Economist after which the remainder of the press jumped on the bandwagon.

In any case the situation had reached such a state that it was decided that Premier Kosygin must come to the dedication of the Isfahan steel mill in hopes that he could smooth things over with the Shah. (Vlassov appeared to imply that the Kosygin visit had been considered previously but dropped). Professing not to be privy to the subjects discussed at the meetings, Vlassov noted that they were held in an air of politeness but that the Russians could not be sure how much of what the Shah said to Kosygin was sincere and how much was Persian taarof.

3. Relations Between the Soviet Embassy and the GOI

Renewing an old complaint, Vlassov said that personal relations between Soviet Embassy officers and Iranian officials remain stiff. He and his colleagues have access to the appropriate Foreign Ministry officials for business purposes but they have no social contacts. He asked the reporting officer to include him on cocktail party guest lists.

Vlassov again asked for assistance in contacting Hormoz Chamanara, an MFA official who once worked in the International Organizations Division, claiming that he wished to discuss the Iranian position on free passage through international straits prior to the Law of the Sea Conference. The reporting officer indicated his understanding that Chamanara was no longer working in that section of the Ministry and agreed with Vlassov's suggestion that he might contact the appropriate US officer for information.

4. Relations Between US and USSR Embassies

Vlassov apologized for the hiatus between our meetings, ascribing the delay to the slack period around Now Ruz. The reporting officer noted that contacts between US and USSR officials seem to have fallen off in general. At one time we had reasonably regular social gatherings but, since the departure of Mr. Nekrasov, our invitations had not been accepted. Had there been a change of policy? Vlassov commented that the invitation might have been sent to the wrong person as it was difficult to say who had replaced Nekrasov. Three Counselors, two political and one economic, have been replaced by three political counselors so that the work is divided up differently. The Soviet Embassy's economic efforts are now under the direction of a First Secretary (name unknown) who acted as interpreter during Kosygin's recent visit.

In any case our regular luncheon meetings should continue and, at Vlassov's suggestion, April [illegible] was set as the date for our next meeting.

COMMENT: Vlassov contention that he does not know who replaced Nekrasov is spurious as the latter was the local KGB chief and thus Vlassov's boss. He gave the impression that additional invitations for large, strictly Russian-American social functions would also be refused.

5. Bio Data

Vlassov mused about work in a stable country noting that, no matter what one did, the Foreign Ministry would be critical of one's reporting. The reporting officer remarked that he was mildly surprized to see Vlassov return to Iran from home leave as he had thought that Vlassov might arrange to be transferred elsewhere. The reply was a sardonic chuckle and a comment that this is not an easy thing to do in the Soviet foreign service.

Elienne, his daughter, is doing well at the university and, after classes and final exams are over, she expects to accompany an archaeology study team to excavations either near Novgorod or in the Crimea.

His son, who is now a good student, is preparing for the examinations which will determine whether or not he will be permitted to continue his education. On May 4, [illegible] wife will leave for the Soviet Union to be with her son at this important time.

Drafting: POL:STEscudero:jp 4/11/73
Clearance: OR:WBromell

Approval: POL:AIKillgore

CONFIDENTIAL

BIO

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: April 28, 1973

SUBJECTS: 1. US Chiefs of Mission Conference
2. Iran/India Relations
3. Iraq/Kuwait Confrontation

PARTICIPANTS: Vladimir Vlassov, Soviet First Secretary
Stanley T. Escudero, Embassy Officer

PLACE: Chetnik's Restaurant over Lunch

REF: Previous Vlassov-Escudero Memcons.

COPIES:

AMB/DCM	BIO
NEA/IRM	INR/OIL/B
INR/RNA	Amconsul KHORRAMSHAHR
POL	Amembassy MOSCOW
POL/M	Amembassy NEW DELHI
OR	Amembassy ISLAMABAD
	Amembassy KUWAIT
	Amembassy KUWAIT PASS MUSCAT
	Amembassy BEIRUT PASS USINT BAGHDAD

1. US Chiefs of Mission Conference.

Vlassov was naturally full of questions concerning the recent Chiefs of Mission Conference held in Tehran but the reporting officer fended off questions with the remark that he had been assigned to the group providing staff support and so knew little concerning the substantive aspects of the meeting. Vlassov speculated that the Conference probably made no policy decisions but merely made recommendations to Washington. Then he noted that the Soviet Embassy in Tehran had made a number of abortive suggestions for a similar conference of Russian ambassadors in the Middle East. the venue for the proposed conference would have been Moscow rather than Tehran or some other Middle Eastern capital. Vlassov and his ambassador support the idea but other Soviet ambassadors seem to prefer the present practice of individual consultations when they go back to the USSR for home leave or change of assignments. To date the Soviet Foreign Ministry has not commented on the proposal for a COM Conference.

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Iran/India Relations.

Possible Iran/India rivalry has been much on Vlassov's mind of late and he engaged in considerable speculation as to what the course of future relations between the two major regional powers might be. Essentially he sees the two as rivals, though he later agreed with the reporting officer's suggestion that it would be the better course for both the US and the USSR to urge Iran and India to cooperate. He remarked, as he has in the past, that India is concerned over the Iranian military build-up and wondered if the Indians were not also concerned about Iran's "adventurism" in Oman. Vlassov said he views the Iranian participation in Oman as more political than military in its conception. That is, it is a test of Iran's military capabilities and offers training for the Imperial troops but he feels that Tehran sees their intervention as a move to see how far they can go without attracting serious criticism from Delhi or the Arab capitals. He also noted in passing that Iranians he had asked about the reported Persian base on a small island off of Oman in the straits of Hormoz had replied that the Iranian facility there is nothing more than a refueling station where ships can unload fresh troops and supplies and take on returning soldiers. Vlassov has been told that Tehran does not leave its troops in Oman more than six weeks or two months so that frequent replacement exercises are necessary.

In the same context Vlassov discussed Iran's relationship with Pakistan. A plot-oriented person, Vlassov hypothesized that, having talked with the Shah, Messrs Rush and Sisco would call on Pak President Bhutto and consider the sub-continent in the light of HIM's comments and the conclusions of the Tehran Conference. He was leading up to the possibility of a future agreement between the Shah and Bhutto which would provide for some form of Iranian assistance in the event of renewed hostilities between Iran and Pakistan. He stated that "Iran is acting like a great power now, so we must expect such developments". He also noted that, from a geopolitical point of view (Vlassov often thinks in geopolitical terms) such an agreement would make a great deal of sense as the two powers would control not only the Persian Gulf but also the Sea of Oman and a portion of the Arabian Sea. Vlassov was unsure, however, if he thought that the Shah was ready to place himself in a position from which he could become embroiled in hostilities with India. He did not make clear whether his reference to the Shah's readiness referred to military preparedness or internal political conditions.

3. Iraq/Kuwait Confrontation.

Concerning the flareup in the continuing border dispute between Iraq and Kuwait, Vlassov professed suprise that the Iranians had not weighed in on the side of the Kuwaitis and said that he personally viewed Prime Minister Hoveyda's statements in London as an invitation to Kuwait to ask for assistance. That they did not do so may be an indication of the depth of their distrust of the Persians but it may also have reflected a desire to settle the problem with Iraq once and for all, through negotiation. Naturally, Vlassov denied that the presence of Russian warships in Iraqi ports was in any way connected with Baghdad's incursion. In fact, he insisted, the Soviets found the Iraqi actions embarrassing.

VLADIMIR VLASSOV

POL:STEScudero:paz

POL:AIKillgore

Classified by S.T.Escudero.
Subject to General Declassification Schedule of EO 11652. Automatically downgraded at two year intervals and declassified on Dec 31, 1979.

CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum of Conversation

SUBJECT: 1. Soviet Inter-Embassy Communications
2. Chinese Influence in Pakistan
3. Iranian Domestic Affairs

PARTICIPANTS: Vladimir Vlassov, Soviet Embassy First Secretary; Stanley Escudero, Embassy Officer

DATE AND PLACE: September 26, 1973; Tehran Club over Lunch

COPIES TO:

AMB/DCM	OR
NEA/IRN	AmConsul Tabriz
INR/RNA	AmConsul Khorramshahr
POL	BIO
INR/OIL/B	Amembassy Moscow

1. Soviet Inter-Embassy Communications - During brief remarks about the situation in Afghanistan, Vlassov complained that his Embassy in Tehran has very little information about events in Kabul as the Soviet Embassy there reports only to Moscow and the Foreign Ministry decides what will be passed to embassies in the field. There is never, he said, even in cases of urgency, direct communication between Soviet embassies. Vlassov described this as a good thing as the Foreign Ministry is in possession of information from various sources and combines this information in analytical reports which it provides to field posts on a need-to-have basis.

2. Chinese Influence in Pakistan - Vlassov noted with some pleasure that the U.S. had rejected a request by Pakistan's President Bhutto during his recent visit to Washington for lethal-end arms. In repetition of a previously expressed theme, he then went on to wonder if this meant that the Americans had now given the Chinese a "green light" to satisfy Pakistan's arms needs. I responded that we hardly have that sort of relationship with Peking and that we did not want to see a future arms race in the sub-continent but he replied that the weapons will surely come from somewhere as a need for arms does not exist in a vacuum and China is the logical supplier.

Classified by STEscudero. Subject to General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652. Automatically downgraded at two-year intervals and declassified on Dec. 31, 1979.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3. Iranian Domestic Affairs - During a discussion of a recently published analysis of the platform of the outlawed Tudeh (Communist) Party as enunciated at the last Party Congress in Iraq, Vlassov opined that the Tudeh would like to return to Iran and operate openly as a legitimate political party but the Shah will not accept it. As for the rebirth of the Mardom Party, Vlassov noted that this Embassy is closely following the fortunes of the official opposition. The Soviets believe that the Shah wants to make the Mardom a sort of watchdog on Prime Minister Hoveyda and his Iran-Novin associates to make certain that he always has a "whip" to use on Hoveyda and the Iran-Novin Party should it ever become necessary.

POL:STEscudero:ct

CONFIDENTIAL

Soviet Embassy

SECRET

2 June 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Ambassador

FROM : A. B. Callahan

SUBJECT : Transmittal of Report

This is a copy of the Memorandum on the Soviet Presence, and intelligence presence in Iran which we have given to the Shah, SAVAK, J-2 and the National Police. Of interest is the fact that when I saw General Nasiri of SAVAK to give him his copy on the morning of 29 May, he had already received from the Shah a copy of the memorandum which I had left with him on the evening of 28 May.

I am sending a copy to Hawk Mills.

Attachment:
1 Memorandum

CC: Mr. Mills w/att

SECRET

SECRET

THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE PRESENCE IN IRAN

A. The Total Soviet Presence

1. There are about 5,000 Soviet citizens in Iran as of May 1974. This figure includes some dependents and many short-term (one year or less) specialists. Among these 67 have been identified as intelligence officers.

2. The largest concentrations of Soviets are in Tehran and Isfahan, with well over 1,000 (including families) in each city. Most of the Soviets in Isfahan are associated with the Aryamehr Steel Mill.

3. The permanent Soviet diplomatic, commercial and other installations in Tehran are: the Embassy (which includes the quasi-autonomous Office of the Economic Counselor), the Trade Representation, the Soviet Hospital, the Aeroflot office, the TASS bureau, the Soviet Insurance Company, the Russo-Iran Bank, and the Iranian-Soviet Transportation Company. In addition, there are Soviet consulates in Isfahan and Rasht, and small offices in Tabriz, Mashad, Bandar Pahlavi and Julfa. All together, over 300 Soviet officials are assigned to these permanent installations.

4. The Office of the Economic Counselor in Tehran is subordinate to the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations (GKES) in Moscow. It is the supervisory headquarters for all Soviet economic and military assistance Projects in Iran. Under this office groups of officials totalling about 100 are assigned to the Tehran headquarters of organizations such as the National Iranian Steel Corporation, the National Iranian Gas Corporation and others. They oversee the work of Soviet specialists throughout the country.

5. 67 Soviet military specialists are employed, mostly in the Tehran area.

6. Outside of Tehran Soviet specialists of various sorts work with the Northern Fisheries Company in Bandar Pahlavi, at the Arak Machine-Tool Plant, in several coal mines, along the Trans-Iran Gas Trunkline, and at the Aryamehr Steel Mill and the Aryashahr construction project. Others are engaged in mineral prospecting, in sturgeon breeding, in building cold storage plants and grain elevators, and other miscellaneous projects.

B. Soviet Intelligence Personnel

7. According to intelligence records: 67 of the Soviets assigned to Iran are known or suspect KGB or GRU intelligence officers. These officers are scattered for cover purposes throughout the various Soviet establishments in Iran.

Establishment	Number of Identified Intelligence Officers
Embassy	
Chancery	27
Tehran Consulate	4
Military Attache's Office	8
Economic Counselor's Office (GKES and SMAP)	5
Isfahan Consulate	3
Rasht Consulate	2
TASS Bureau	1
Aeroflot Office	1
Soviet Insurance Company (Tehran, Tabriz, Mashad)	1
Russo-Iran Bank	1
Soviet Trade Representation	11
Soviet Hospital	3
TOTAL	67

8. The figure of 67 intelligence officers is a very conservative one. We know that some Soviet intelligence officers assigned to Iran have not come to security notice for various reasons. Some are engaged in technical operations such as radio interception inside Soviet installations; others are security officers checking on other Soviet citizens; others still are young officers serving their first familiarization tours in Iran which is a traditional assignment post of Soviet intelligence apprentices.

9. It is interesting to note that the Soviets maintain a staff of 16 officials including 3 identified intelligence officers in their Isfahan consulate to take care of the thousand-odd Soviet citizens working there.

POL SUBJ.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~NSC~~
~~S~~
IIP
JS
Dip Bio - USSR

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Guennady Kazankin, Second Secretary, Soviet Embassy
John D. Stempel, Political Officer

DATE & PLACE: April 14, 1976 - Pizza Roma Restaurant

SUBJECT: Soviet Contact - Miscellaneous Political Items

COPIES TO: AMB/DCM BIO INR/OIL/B
POL NEA/IRN CHRON
OR INR/RNA

Dip Bio - Stempel

Kazankin had asked me to lunch about five days ago. He took me to the Pizza Roma Restaurant on Karim Khan-e-zand which is just down the street from the Russian-operated hospital, where he had been before. In the course of a low-key conversation, we discussed the following significant items:

1. Iran/Cuba Diplomatic Break. Kazankin asked me why I thought Iran had broken relations. I suggested it was due to the Shah's uneasiness over Cuba's activities in Angola and Dhofar, plus a general Iranian wish to signal the communist world that intervention in others' affairs was unacceptable to Iran. What was Soviet thinking? He said (with great confidence) that the Shah broke relations with Cuba on the eve of Hoveyda's visit to Saudi Arabia to show the Saudis that Iran was the staunchest anti-communist power in the Persian Gulf. Kazankin added that the Iranians were trying to show the Saudis that it was stupid for Saudi Arabia to try to push Ira out of Persian Gulf affairs. He added, "You know the Saudis are behind all this business over the name Arab Gulf?" When I offered a mild demurer that Iraq seemed a more likely candidate for troublemaker, Kazankin added that the Iraqis really had nothing to gain and it was clearly the Saudis. I said his idea seemed a bit far-fetched, and the matter was dropped.

2. Lebanon. What were Kazankin's views on Lebanon? He replied that the situation was extremely complex and there appeared to be no easy solution. I told him I expected to hear more, since the Russians and Syrians were such good friends. He said even the Syrians are not sure what is happening.

CONFIDENTIAL

64

CONFIDENTIAL

3. Rockefeller Visit. Kazankin, noting my Vice Presidential cuff links (worn especially to draw the question), asked what Rockefeller had been "up to at Kish Island." I said it was basically a good will trip with little substance discussed. The Vice President reassured the Shah that despite some (arms payment) scandals, the U.S. remained a staunch friend of Iran. Kazankin then alluded to various rumors about the visit--in a low conspiratorial voice, he said the Shah is supposed to have asked Rockefeller for a loan. I pulled him up short on this one, asking rhetorically why the Iranian would need a loan, but adding that perhaps the Shah lobbied with Rockefeller for a better deal on oil prices. Kazankin also said it was rumored Rockefeller had asked the Shah to give Iranian arms to Egypt. I laughed and said this was very unlikely, since any such arrangement would have to be approved by the American Congress and given the present debate over a mere six cargo planes, Congress would hardly approve the transfer of arms.

4. Soviet Arms to Egypt. In a similar vein, I asked him why the Soviets had not approved the giving of Indian spare parts to Egypt since this had been one of the principal reasons Sadat gave for breaking off relations. Kazankin snorted and said this was probably the 11th or 12th reason. "Oh, then what were the others?" Kazankin replied it was well known that the Americans had been trying to get the Soviets thrown out of Egypt. We both laughed.

5. U.S./Iranian Relations. Asked about difficulties between the U.S. and Iran, I replied there were not any major problems, but there were the usual small frictions between two countries who had close ties. He pressed me for an answer and I said that there were many Americans in Iran and there were the usual frictions with Iranians, "The same sorts of problems the Soviet Union had in Egypt." He smiled grimly and tried once more to raise the issue, but I parried.

6. Terrorism. Kazankin wondered whether we had had any recent difficulties with terrorists. I said things had been mercifully quiet for the past couple of months, but that we remain concerned. What was his view of the Iranian belief the PLO was aiding Iranian terrorists groups? He said he thought this was not true, although perhaps a few Iranians were being trained in "centers abroad." Kazankin professed to have no idea where these centers were located. He then asked what I thought about the OPEC raid and whether I had any idea who Carlos really was. I said Carlos

CONFIDENTIAL

was a Venezuelan who seemed to be very much in the clutches of the Libyans. Kazankin said he thought the Western powers had been supporting Carlos' OPEC kidnappings to fragment OPEC unity. I laughed and replied this was bull crap, nothing could have been better designed to reinforce OPEC unity. Everything I had seen suggested the operation had Libyan backing, adding puckishly that if the KGB and the CIA really wanted to do something useful they should eliminate all of these warts on the face of progress. Kazankin laughed and surprisingly agreed.

7. Kazankin Himself. Kazankin had one-half of his stomach removed because of a bleeding ulcer while in Afghanistan a few years ago. The effects became obvious when he reacted very strongly to the special pizza he had ordered. His subdued manner through the middle half of the lunch was undoubtedly due to gastric disturbances occasioned by hot pepperoni and spiced sausage. He confirmed that his wife Yelena had studied abroad in Vietnam and said she had also been in Laos during her younger days. They were both students at Moscow's Foreign Affairs Insitute when they met and married 16 years ago. They have a 13-year-old daughter who will be coming to Iran in June, an 8-year-old son and a 3-month-old baby. Kazankin very much wanted to have lunch together again and we set a tentative date for April 28. He passed two booklets to me containing Brezhnev's and Kosygin's speeches to the 25th CPSU Congress. Obviously I have replaced Escudero as a Soviet U.S. Embassy working level contact.

POL:JDStempel:mll

1 POL:JDST
2 POL BIO

USSR

SECRET/NOFORN

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Guennady Kazankin, Second Secretary of the USSR Embassy
John D. Stempel, Political Officer

DATE & PLACE: April 28, 1976 - Tiffany's Restaurant and Tehran Steak House

SUBJECT: Exchange of Views on Political Subjects

COPIES TO:			
	AMB/DCM	BIO	INR/RNA
	POL	Amconsul ISFAHAN	INR/OIL/B
	OR	NEA/IRN	CHRON

Kazankin began our encounter by locking himself out of his car while waiting to pick me up opposite the Embassy. He pressed me to have our motor pool mechanic open the car rather than call his Embassy for an extra key. After checking with OR, I asked the motor pool to try and open the car. Since their specialist was at lunch, Kazankin and I went to eat at Tiffany's. The motor pool mechanic subsequently opened the car and drove it to the visitors parking lot and had the keys waiting for us when we returned. As he picked up the car I said he would probably be having it debugged; he laughed and replied, "Of course."

Kazankin was nervous and slightly distracted during our lunch. He later suggested we finish lunch with coffee at the Tehran Steak House. Since I had picked up the tab for lunch, I assume this was because he needed to show a receipt to his Embassy and wanted to finesse the question of locking himself out of the car. By the time we parted, Kazankin carefully made another luncheon date for May 12 and was able to add jokingly that he would show up "with key next time." I do not believe he will voluntarily explain to his Embassy why the car wound up in our parking lot.

Lunch was very relaxed and began with casual conversation about life in Tehran. Kazankin asked me when I planned to take a holiday and I replied in late August. He indicated he would be returning to Russia in September to put his two oldest children in school and take a short vacation. Upon hearing of our tentative plans to travel by train to Turkey and Europe, he suggested that I go through Moscow. I asked him what the rates were, and he said first-class to Moscow to Tehran was only 50 rubles and suggested checking with Gulf Travel Agency which handles in-tourist bookings.

I replied it was worth looking into but we had really wanted to see Turkey.

Kazankin clearly had two prime subjects in mind to work over at this lunch:

a. The Recent RCD Conference at Izmir. Kazankin asked our evaluation of the just-concluded RCD summit meeting. I replied that we thought the meeting had produced good atmospherics but not much substance. It seemed to show that bilateral ties between each pair of the three were good, but that the organization was still reluctant to take steps toward greater integration. He replied that this was the Soviet view too, and asked if we had heard about any military agreements arising from the meeting. I replied that I personally had not and did not think there would be any. The three countries were content to keep the alliance in being but did not wish to go further unless there was a threat, "perhaps from a larger neighbor." Kazankin smiled and dropped the subject.

b. Iran's Future. At the conclusion of coffee at the Tehran Steak House, Kazankin asked my views about the future of Iran/American relations and gradually pushed the discussion toward what happens in Iran when the Shah goes.

I said Iran/American relations were good and that we expected them to continue so, adding that Iran undoubtedly saw the U.S. as a counter-weight to historic foreign influence. Kazankin said, "But it is you Americans who have the influence here and tell the Shah what to do." I laughingly asked if he were serious--he looked somewhat sheepish and said that sometimes it seemed this way--after all, Iran had broken relations with Cuba two days after President Ford had verbally attacked the Cubans during an election speech. I replied that this was sheer coincidence, but it did not seem unreasonable to me that Iran should be concerned at the foreign presence of Cubans, particularly in Middle East areas of interest to Iran.

Kazankin then turned to Iran's future. I suggested there was a great deal of uncertainty as to what would happen when the Shah eventually left the scene. Kazankin said, "No, no, I mean if he were to be taken away by accident, what do you think." I replied it would probably depend upon the circumstances. If there were no suspicions

of foul play, the Regency Council and the Empress would take over. The U.S. would support the legitimate succession to the Throne. Kazankin broke in saying, "But aren't you already preparing yourselves for the next step after that?" Reply: "Of course not, we Americans are too pragmatic for that. Isn't it the Marxist/Leninists who have the long range plans for the future?"

Kazankin pressed the point home, asking whether we thought Empress Farah was strong enough to take control. I replied that Farah seemed quite capable and was obviously appearing more in public but that of course her eventual role would depend upon circumstances. In fact, the whole problem of political succession in Iran was much more uncertain than most countries.

In reply to my question about Soviet views on Iran's future, Kazankin said the USSR favors the people's determining their own form of government. I needled: "With a little Cuban help?" Kazankin: "No, we have confidence that the will of the people will determine what happens." He added that the USSR simply was not sure what would happen. His response seemed rehearsed.

Kazankin almost timidly raised the morning's Associated Press story about a KGB assassin department. When I asked him if it were true and how many people went around on that kind of mission, Kazankin said very smoothly (as if the denial had been well rehearsed), of course, there were no such departments like that in the KGB. I blandly asked him if I could assure the Ambassador that this were true. He asked whether I reported all our meetings to the Ambassador. I said no, not specifically, but I made a little note of them for our standard diplomatic files so that if it became necessary to contact the Soviet Embassy we would know with whom we had talked. Kazankin accepted this as normal and said that he used information gathered in reports on various things "like the RCD Conference", and we agreed this was normal among diplomats.

Kazankin went on to add that he enjoyed our lunches since his contacts in Iran were so bad. "The Iranians really do not want to talk to us and you have all kinds of groups like the Iran/America Society to make things easier." I expressed surprise that the Soviets did not have such a friendship group here since they seemed to have them

in most countries. Kazankin said the Iranians did not really seem to be interested in that kind of society.

Additional Miscellaneous Comments. In the course of conversation, Kazankin offered the following random items:

a. There are about 50 families living in the Soviet compound and about 10 families living in houses outside the compound. He said only a few of the wives worked.

b. Kazank[illegible] and his colleagues eat at the Tehran Steak House fairly often. He knew the waiters and vice versa, and in reply to my question, said he came there occasionally.

c. He gave me a copy of CPSU: Stages of History, a slick Novosti Press Agency publication which reviews Communist Party achievements as seen through the Party Congresses. I asked if he were a Communist Party activist (the book's term) or a regular member. He said he was a regular member since diplomatic work left little time for anything else, and asked if I was a political party member in America. I explained the meaning of "membership" was not the same in America since there were no official lists. In fact, at different times I had been registered both as a Democrat and Republican, but was currently registered as a Republican to vote in the Indiana State primary. He digested this, then asked who would win the American election. I replied it was too early to tell, that it appeared Carter might be the Democratic nominee. I personally thought no matter whether Carter or Humphrey emerged as the Democratic candidate, the election would be close.

POL:JDStempel:mjl

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Hawthorne O. Mills
THRU : Gordon Winkler
FROM : Richard Max McCarthy

DATE: June 6, 1976

SUBJECT: Soviet Press Call

Soviet Second Secretary and Press Attache Vladimir Fenopetov made a "courtesy call" at my USIS Office at 3:00 PM on Sunday, May 23. My wife, Ellen, was present.

A dark haired, bespectacled Leningrad native in his mid-thirties, Fenopetov is married to a physician, and they have no children. He freely expressed opinions on several regional issues:

1. It is difficult for him to persuade the Iranian Press to use U.S.S.R. news releases and other Soviet printed materials.

2. He scans and translates the local press daily and finds many "distortions." He ascribes this mainly to the fact that the Iranian Press uses chiefly U.S. wire service copy.

3. As Mrs. Ghandi said, "we have no base in the Indian Ocean, the Soviet Navy merely refuels in Somalia."

4. He mentioned the clandestine radio broadcasts beamed at Iran, saying—?

5. The Soviets supported the Angola uprising in part because it was a broad-based "movement."

6. The dissident forces in Iran are not large enough to be termed a "movement."

When I casually inquired whether the U.S.S.R. would support the opposition elements in Iran if they developed into what he terms a "movement," he fumbled a bit and mumbled a non-answer.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Guennady Kazankin, Second Secretary, Russian Embassy
John D. Stempel, First Secretary

DATE & PLACE: June 16, 1976 - Shiraz Nights Restaurant (in Zargandeh)

SUBJECTS: Isfahan Religious Murders, Soviet-Iraq Relations, and Sadat's Visit to Iran

COPIES TO:

AMB/DCM	OR	NEA/IRN
POL	SECURITY	INR/RNA
POL/M	BIO	INR/OIL/B
ECON	Amconsul ISFAHAN	CHRON

Kazankin picked me up as usual in front of the Embassy. With him were two of his children who had been playing at the Soviet Embassy during the morning, Boris, 9, and Natasha, 13. We dropped his children off at their home in the Russian summer compound in Zargandeh and ate lunch at a nearby restaurant. Random pleasantries aside, the following were items of interest:

Isfahan Religious Murders

Kazankin was determined to get my views on the killing of Ayatollah Shamsabadi (see Tehran A-101 of May 27, 1976 NOTAL) and the resulting turmoil surrounding the capture of the alleged killers. He returned to the subject three or four times, knowing I had just spent 7 days in Isfahan. I replied there seemed to be a surprising lack of interest in the subject; most Isfahanis thought the true killers had been arrested. In response to my inquiry as to what stories he had heard, Kazankin replied that many religious figures were really against the government. I "allowed as how" perhaps the full story of the killing had not come out, but went no further. He added that there seemed to be a real struggle between the religious leaders and the government going on, albeit underground. I said there was some dissatisfaction with the change from a Moslem to a Persian dynastic calendar, then pressed him for more details. He said there had been some unrest in Qom, and we both agreed this would be significant if Mashad also showed some signs of unease. (Mashad, Qom, and Isfahan are the centers of Moslem religious fervor and organization in Iran).

CONFIDENTIAL

Soviet-Iraq Relations

Kazankin pressed me for "your Embassy's view" of Soviet-Iraq relations. I told him I did not think we were terribly interested, beyond our general hope that the USSR would counsel moderation and accommodation to the Baghdad regime. I volunteered to have a better understanding of the situation next time we met.

Sadat's Visit to Iran

Conversation naturally gravitated to the current visit of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to Iran. After byplay about whether the U.S. or the USSR was really Egypt's friend now, Kazankin volunteered that Sadat was in Tehran to ask for economic and military aid. I replied that a request for economic aid seemed reasonable, but it was unlikely Egypt would ask Iran for military aid too, since the Shah is building up his own forces. Kazankin said, half jokingly, "Well, aren't the Egyptians going to get it from you through some sort of deal with Iran?" I replied that the U.S. Congress was unlikely to supply anything via that route, given the difficulties with providing the 6 C-130's. He caught the point and nodded.

In reply to my question as to what Iran would get out of helping the Egyptians, Kazankin said Iran would get political help with the Arab states. Egypt would use its influence in support of Iran's Persian Gulf policies and press Iraq to continue its policy of accommodation. I said it sounded good to me, but unless the Iranians saw it as in their interest to help Egypt, they would not do so. Kazankin said that the U.S. "would undoubtedly tell the Shah" to help Sadat. I replied that may be the way it's done between the USSR and the Eastern European countries, but in view of Iranian discontent with oil prices and sales, I doubted we had that kind of leverage even if we were so inclined.

Miscellaneous (Bio and Other)

Kazankin agreed to bring his family to lunch at my house July 7, though he again declined to be my guest at our Embassy compound restaurant, pleading for "neutral ground." When I suggested picking him up at the Russian Embassy, he demurred, saying "The Iranians always follow us." His daughter speaks reasonably good English, but is shy about

CONFIDENTIAL

doing so. She did tell her father (in the car) in Russian that his English was "completely covered" with a Russian accent. Kazankin showed little interest in terrorist activities, a subject he pursued the last time we met, (see my May 12 memcon) and confirmed that he would be returning to Russia for several weeks holiday on August 25. His high blood pressure is back to normal, and he was able to down his usual vodka with beer chaser.

While returning to the Embassy, Kazankin commented that he found it easy to talk to me, easier than talking to Consular Officer Waldimir Skotzko (at whose house Kazankin and I met), who "seems very serious." I said Scotty did not seem that way to me, and the matter was dropped.

POL:JDStempel:mjl

B10

K

CONFIDENTIAL

Amembassy Tehran

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

July 12, 1976

SUBJECT: Soviet Interest in Possible Kissinger Visit and Other Political Matters

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Guennady Kazankin
Second Secretary, USSR Embassy

John D. Stempel
First Secretary, American Embassy

PLACE: Tehran Steak House

COPIES TO: AMB/DCM
ARMISH/MAAG
POL/M
ECON
OR
BIO
NEA/IRN
NR/RNA
INR/OIL/B

At lunch today, Kazankin was unusually forthcoming and more willing to discuss various problems than he has been in the past. This may be due to the fact that this lunch was postponed for ten days, and he had several specific points to raise. We discussed the following:

Possible Kissinger Visit to Iran - Kazankin was very interested in the July 1 Rastakhiz newspaper report that Secretary Kissinger would visit Iran. I replied that we had heard the same rumors but had nothing definite on a possible visit. Kazankin needled me for several minutes and asked what the Secretary would be visiting Iran for, if he came. I replied that if he came to Iran it would simply be a goodwill visit, for we saw no major issues on the Iran-American horizon.

Syrian President Asad's Visit to Iran - Kazankin asked if I knew anything about President Asad's forthcoming visit to Iran. I replied I had not even heard of it and he said with assurance that Asad would be coming to Iran within 5 or 6 days. In reply to my question "What for?", Kazankin said Asad was looking for friends to help him out in Lebanon. I told Kazankin he ought to know the

answer to that since the USSR and Syria were good friends and Soviet weapons were being used in Lebanon. He reacted defensively and said Asad had not consulted the Soviet Union regarding his policy in Lebanon. He added the Soviets thoroughly disapproved of the Syrians fighting the Palestinians. He also expressed regret at Ambassador Meloy's death.

Iran-Occidental Oil Deal - Occidental's proposed oil deal with Iran interested Kazankin. He asked me for my views (usually the sign of a prepared question). I said the Embassy had heard very little one way or another. As he undoubtedly knew from the Occidental-Soviet oil deal, Armand Hammer works very much alone. I had seen no public opposition to the deal though this was not my field. It had not yet, to my knowledge, been formally approved. Kazankin said this was the first time a country other than Iran or Russia had been given exploration rights in the Caspian area and wondered if this was important. I said it was a function of the deal itself and had no political significance.

Russian Driver Killed - In response to a Kazankin question on "the situation in Iran," I expressed satisfaction that so many terrorists had been rounded up. Kazankin replied he thought the "alleged terrorist threat" would continue and referred matter of factly to the death of a Soviet transport driver near Qazvin about ten days to two weeks ago. The driver's body was found and there had been no visible attempt to steal the truck's cargo of dried grapes. The Soviets suspect either bandits or terrorists.

Miscellaneous - As we were paying the bill Kazankin asked how much money the U.S. Government gave me to spend on entertainment. I replied it varied, but about $125 every three months, though I always spent more. Kazankin commented that he got less than that but almost always spent more out of his own pocket. He also seemed curious as to why I carry three pencils in my pocket (I believe he has always thought at least one was a "bug"). I field stripped 1) my ball point pen, 2) my antique USG mechanical pencil, and 3) my Cross felt-tipped pen, explaining why I carried three. Kazankin may have appreciated my manual dexterity, but he still seemed half convinced there was something funny about carrying three pencils.

POL:JDStempel:ej

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Miscellaneous Political Items

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Guennady Kazankin, Second Secretary, Russian Embassy

John D. Stempel, Political Officer

PLACE & DATE: Tehran Steak House -- October 18, 1976

DISTRIBUTION: AMB/DCM, POL, POL/M, ECON, OR, DAO, BIO, Amconsul TABRIZ, NEA/IRN, INR/RNA, INR/OIL/B

Kazankin, who returned from 50 days vacation in the Soviet Union over a week ago, was in good form. He had spent part of his vacation in a sanitarium which enabled his ulcer to heal almost completely and had brought his blood pressure down. He celebrated this occasion by ordering vodka "for the first time since June." During our conversation, we touched on the following points:

David Rockefeller

Kazankin was particularly curious about the recent visit of David Rockefeller to Tehran. I was able to tell him only that I understood Rockefeller had been here briefly and was now gone. Kazankin returned to this subject three times over the course of our lunch (it is obviously a priority item for Soviet intelligence). I chided him about accepting the traditional Marxist linkage between big capital and big government, and he responded in the same light vein with his usual patronizing words about Americans never being aware of "fundamental" relationships between big capital and government.

I surmised that Rockefeller was just passing through. Kazankin asked me twice if Rockefeller had seen the Shah, and I told him I simply had no information on the visit beyond the stray fact that Rockefeller had been here, which I had picked up through casual conversation while riding home the previous evening.

Giscard's Visit

Kazankin also was particularly interested in the results of the French President's visit. He returned to this subject two or three times despite my suggestion that everything important had been in the papers. On the third try his interest centered on the question of nuclear fuel reprocessing. (He was unaware of the correct terminology but recognized the expression "nuclear waste reprocessing" when I used it.) I thought the French had avoided substantive discussion of the problem with Iran by agreeing to sell Iran only two nuclear reactors. I recalled that a French official comment in the Herald Tribune some days later suggested that the French were considering moving closer to our position on nuclear waste control.

Soviet-Iran Relations

Since Kazankin had been out of Iran for some time, he kept asking what had gone on here. I took the opportunity to outline the public record on the deterioration of Soviet-Iran relations, including this morning's article in the Tehran Journal on Soviet arms sales to Iraq, and asked his reaction. Kazankin described Soviet-Iran relations as "neither good nor bad." He suggested that economic ties continued and said the present visit of Soviet Minister of Commerce would result in a new five-year economic agreement at "approximately double" the present level of Soviet-Iran trade. (Note: This was reflected in the follow morning's papers.) Kazankin professed ignorance as to the composition of this trade, but said he thought it was probably merely an expansion of existing arrangements.

Under questioning, Kazankin admitted the Russians were being highly critical of Iran's arms deals with the U.S. and asked me why I thought Iran needed sophisticated arms. I replied that the Iranians thought they needed the arms to protect themselves against Iraq, which was receiving sophisticated Soviet weaponry. Kazankin volunteered no response and slid to another subject. (Previously he had made the defense that Iraq really has no major capability to attack Iran; this time, he simply dropped the subject.)

Internal Iranian Politics

In a general discussion of Iranian political affairs, Kazankin said the Soviet Embassy had not really followed the local council elections because it did not think they were very important. He volunteered the opinion that Hoveyda would remain as Prime Minister and indicated Fereidun Mahdavi would be the most likely Secretary General for the Resurgence Party. I argued Mahdavi was a serious candidate, but said I had heard a number of other names as well. He admitted to hearing the names of Majidi and Baheri as possible candidates but volunteered no others. Kazankin said the Soviet Embassy believes there will be Cabinet changes early in November and thought that if Prime Minister Hoveyda is replaced, Ansary would probably get the job. I agreed with him that Hoveyda's replacement was unlikely, but said I thought neither Ansary nor Amouzegar would be named to succeed Hoveyda if he did go because that would suggest favoritism to one Party Wing over the other. Kazankin pooh-poohed the importance of Wings and thought they would have no affect on future appointments or on politics in general.

NOTE: Kazankin did NOT raise the question of possible U.S. asylum for mail plane pilot Zasimov, who has been in Iranian hands since September 24. He did not even mention the subject, which I had expected him to at least touch on.

POL:JDStempel/mp

CONFIDENTIAL
GDS

Register No. 3861704K

SECRET

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Ser 00/8500332
15 November 1976

SECRET - FLAG OFFICERS EYES ONLY
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL FLAG OFFICERS

Subj: Flag Officer Newsletter Item

1. I recently advised you of my decision to initiate a new FONL procedure for sending you items aperiodically. This memorandum is in keeping with that procedure.

2. On 29 October 1976, LT Viktor Belenko, the Soviet MIG-25 pilot who defected to the U.S., made an overnight visit to USS INDEPENDENCE at sea. The visit had an extraordinary impact on LT Belenko and was characterized by his USAF escort officer as the highlight thus far of LT Belenko's stay in the United States.

3. I thought you would be interested in LT Belenko's observations about operations and life aboard a U.S. carrier and I enclose extracts of those observations.

4. Because both the extracts and the fact that LT Belenko visited a U.S. carrier are classified and sensitive, I have chosen to send you this information on a FLAG OFFICERS EYES ONLY basis. However, I would have no objection if you wished to pass on some of the information on a classified, oral basis to selected subordinates.

J. L. HOLLOWAY III
Admiral, U.S. Navy

3-1

CLASSIFIED BY: CNO
EXEMPT FROM G.D.S. OF
E.O. 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2
DECLASSIFY ON: Date Cannot Be Determined

SECRET

SECRET - FLAG OFFICERS EYES ONLY
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

SECRET

SECRET - FLAG OFFICERS EYES ONLY
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

EXTRACTS OF LT BELENKO'S OBSERVATIONS

- Belenko was altogether overwhelmed by watching the intense pace of highly orchestrated and coordinated activity aboard ship during recovery and launch operations. He commented, "What I have just seen is most incredible, fantastic - it is like visiting another planet. This is the most professional performance I have ever seen. Everybody knows what he is supposed to do and does it without being told by some higher official. I am amazed that such large numbers of people are active in so many phases of flight deck handling of aircraft and that they work together in complete harmony without screaming or arguments. I bet the Soviets would give anything to see what I have seen today."

- After dinner, Belenko was taken to the Operations Center and shown how aircraft are tracked. He observed night flight operations from the Captain's Bridge. Throughout, he was incredulous at the efficiency, discipline, and remarkable skill displayed in handling the aircraft and ship systems. He commented several times that he had never before observed such professionalism and proficiency.

- Belenko was quite surprised to learn that all levels of aircraft maintenance and repair are carried out aboard the aircraft carrier: "You mean to tell me that you don't have to send them to a factory like it is done in my country? Incomprehensible - completely unbelievable. I am seeing a different world. If I could take you to my country and show you the way we do things, how we are organized, and how we treat people - you would not believe me - the same way I cannot believe what I am seeing. Yet I know that what I am seeing is not a staged performance. I see 4,500 people at work in total harmony, professionals who know their jobs, and all doing their work with complete confidence."

- Food was a central feature of his interests aboard ship. In the officers mess, Belenko was concerned about how much food he could have. When told there was no limit, he proceeded to overload his plate. From observing a sign saying $75 on the wall, he was told that the officers' monthly food bill aboard ship was $75. "How much does a lieutenant earn?" "About $1200 a month."You mean to tell me that an officer

CLASSIFIED BY: CNO
EXEMPT FROM G.D.S. OF
E.O. 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2
DECLASSIFY ON: Date Cannot Be Determined

SECRET

SECRET - FLAG OFFICERS EYES ONLY
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

SECRET

SECRET - FLAG OFFICERS EYES ONLY
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

only pays $75 out of that large salary for all of this food. Incredible!" The enlisted mess was even more difficult for Belenko to comprehend. Aside from his thorough enjoyment of the high quality and unlimited portions of food, he was genuinely surprised to hear that the line was open 24 hours a day when flight operations were in progress and that enlisted personnel could eat whenever they wanted to and as much as they wanted. He pursued the subject endlessly.

- On his final morning, the Defector observed refueling operations; watched an aircraft being lifted to the flight deck; and conducted a walkthrough of the laundry, PX, sick bay, enlisted lounge, and sailor's mess. His concluding comment on the enlisted mess was that there seemed to be a greater choice of food than in the officers' mess.

- When asked what had impressed him the most during his visit, Belenko replied: "Professionalism, job knowledge, manner of job execution, and the dedication of the people involved." Belenko repeatedly made it clear that he had never seen such skill and efficiency as he observed aboard the USS INDEPENDENCE.

SECRET

2

SECRET - FLAG OFFICERS EYES ONLY
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

SECRET

SRF Memo #158
3 February 1977

(2)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chargé d'Affaires
~~Acting DCM~~
POL

FROM : SRF

SUBJECT : Vladimir Mikhaylovich VINOGRADOV, newly appointed Soviet Ambassador to Iran

Attached for your information is a recent biographic summary prepared on Vladimir Mikhaylovich VINOGRADOV, along with a copy of the Biographic Register sheet prepared in 1967.

Attachment: As stated above

SECRET

USSR Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

OFFICE OF CENTRAL REFERENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
BIOGRAPHIC REGISTER

An economist and experienced trade official, Vinogradov was appointed USSR Deputy Foreign Minister in April 1967 after serving for more than four years as Soviet Ambassador to Japan. Until his previous assignment he had never held a post in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, although his trade responsibilities required frequent travel abroad. A comparatively young man, Vinogradov appears to have favorably impressed the Soviet leadership with his recent performance in Tokyo.

Vinogradov was born on 2 August 1921, in Vinnitsa, Ukrainian SSR. Shortly after graduating from the All-Union Foreign Trade Academy in 1948 he joined the Ministry of Foreign Trade. From 1948 to 1952 Vinogradov served as Head of the Economic Research Division of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and then as Acting Trade Representative at the Soviet Embassy in London. Afterwards he concurrently held the positions of Acting Head of the Export Administration and Head of the Administration of Trade with Western Countries of the Ministry of Foreign Trade from 1952 until 1956. He occupied the latter post until September 1962, when he became Soviet Chief of Mission in Tokyo.

Vinogradov has traveled extensively to Western countries. In 1954 he visited Argentina, Uruguay, and Denmark, and headed the first Soviet trade delegation to Yugoslavia after resumption of Soviet-Yugoslavian relations. Other trips from 1954 to 1956 included trade missions to Mexico, Austria, and France. Vinogradov was listed as an economist and number-two man on a 1956 Soviet trade delegation to Canada, a group composed of highly competent area specialists. In 1959 he accompanied N. S. Khrushchev to the United States, and visited Norway and Italy on official business. Vinogradov accompanied Khrushchev to Vienna in 1961 and led a delegation to Italy in the same year. His most recent travel was in March and April 1967 when he accompanied First Deputy Foreign Minister V. V. Kuznetsov on a temporary tour of duty in Washington and the United Nations in New York.

Vinogradov's appointment as Ambassador to Japan apparently signified Soviet desire to accelerate trade with that nation and at the same time to offset potential difficulties in that area with the Common Market. His pleasant manner and skillful negotiating ability were in marked contrast to the scornful approach of his predecessor N. T. Fedorenko, who had thoroughly alienated the Japanese Government. Vinogradov's contacts with government and business leaders paved the way for an expanded three-year trade agreement which was signed by the USSR and

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Vladimir Mikhaylovich VINOGRADOV (cont.)

Japan in February 1963. Despite the favorable impressions created by Vinogradov's overt activities, his behind-the-scenes manipulation of Japanese leftist groups led some Western observers to believe that he was an intelligence agent. At any rate his tenure was marked by increased efficiency and frequent liaison activities by Embassy personnel.

A large-set, impressive-looking man, Vinogradov has brown hair, blue eyes, and a ruddy complexion. He has been described as having a cheerful disposition and has acquired the reputation of being a tactful but long-winded negotiator. He speaks fluent English, very limited Japanese, and reportedly, some Spanish. His wife, Yelena Anatol'yevna, born in 1919, speaks fluent Japanese. The couple has one daughter, Yelena Vladimirovna.

14 July 1967

USSR

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: MidEast, Horn of Africa, President Carter and Congressional Visits, Dissident Development, Plots, and Miscellaneous

PARTICIPANTS: Guennady Kazankin, Soviet First Secretary
John D. Stempel, First Secretary, AmEmbassy Tehran

PLACE AND DATE: Wednesday, December 14, 1977, Tehran Steak House

DISTRIBUTION: AMB/DCM, POL, OR, BIO, NEA/IRN, IRN/RNA, INR/OIL/B, AF

This was the second lunch I have had with Kazankin since my return from home leave in September. In view of recent developments (illegal Soviet overflights to Ethiopia, Pravda distortions of U.S. MidEast position, etc.), I hit him hard on a number of issues and expressed my personal displeasure at present trends in Soviet policy without becoming personally abusive. The conversation by subject, is summarized below:

MidEast

I waded in immediately, asking what on earth the USSR thought it was doing to peace prospects in the mideast. He replied that the Americans seemed to be managing the Cairo meeting very well; my answer stressed this meeting was at the initiative of both parties, not the U.S., and attacked the Pravda distortion of Secretary Vance's remarks (Moscow 17870). He replied with some petulance that he "knew nothing of this article," and I closed out the conversation with "you should find out; your government is not being very helpful on this issue. Stop distorting our position."

Carter Visit to Iran

Kazankin wanted to know what the President was going to talk to the Shah about. I replied that the visit would be a short one and that only the principals knew what they would be discussing. Kazankin opined that the Washington visit had gone badly, especially because of the demonstrations, and I said that on the contrary, it was an excellent chance for the two leaders to get together and renew the personal rapport they had established in Washington. Kazankin said "So all is sweetness and light?" to which the reply, "It would seem so."

POL:JDStempel:bjh

CONFIDENTIAL

Dissident Developments

Kazankin took particular pains to probe repeatedly about the recent spate of demonstrations, speeches, etc. I suggested mildly that he might be able to tell me, since it was being charged that these demonstrators were inspired by foreign powers. In his most pious, injured voice, he denied any links with the demonstrations or demonstrators, insisting that they were simply "the will of the people," or perhaps "inspired by you." I laughed and deflected further attempts at discussion by repeating the you-tell-me theme. It did appear that the recent activity on the campuses caught the Soviets a bit by surprise, since Kazankin was scarcely familiar with any of the details of the demonstration, even those in the press. I did not try to enlighten him.

Congressional Visits

In addition to the Carter visit and dissident activities, Kazankin seems interested in "reports" he had heard about U.S. congressional delegations visiting Iran. He said there was one scheduled before Christmas, I said that there were none, referring vaguely to "a couple" scheduled after Christmas. When he struggled with Zablocki's name, I repeated that there were tentative plans for two or three visits after the President's trip but pleaded ignorance to exact details because they were not firm. (COMMENT: Kazankin stopped just short of asking me what executive-legislative differences were emerging within the USG, but it was clear that the Soviets are very interested in congressional trips as possible indicators of differences between the White House and the Hill.)

Military Plot

Kazankin referred to a rumor he had heard that there was a military plot to overthrow the regime, involving 25-26 military officers who had been arrested. I said I had heard nothing along those lines, and he continued fishing as to whether we knew about any officers arrested for espionage. I allowed as how I had heard rumors, but had not been able to check them out. (COMMENT: On December 15, the Persian press reported the trial of Geneal Mogharrebi for espionage "on behalf of a foreign power," but neither then or later has any press story referred to the fact that he was spying for the USSR.)

Illegal Soviet Overflights to Ethiopia

Near the end of the lunch, I announced there was one other thing that really annoyed us and asked him what the USSR was doing for peace in the Horn of Africa. He replied that the USSR was

CONFIDENTIAL

assisting the Ethiopians to counter reckless Somali aggression. I smiled and said this did not seem to be the Soviet's week--first lying about our Secretary of State, the illegally overflying a number of countries in order to subvert the OAU initiative to bring peace to the region. I wondered what this sort of thing was doing to the long-term prospects from Soviet-American detente. Noting that my views were personal, but shared by a great many people in our government, I jumped on his protestations of knowing nothing about the flights and suggested that he inform himself and after he had done that, h should let his colleagues know that the Americans and pr bly a number of others were not very pleased and that it sure would not hurt "if the USSR knocked off violating third party airspace on behalf of its expansionist plans." Not up to his usual response to a waving red flag, Kazankin merely shrugged it off with, "well, that's your point of view; mine is different." We ended the discussion with my comment that it was about time the USSR considered getting in step with the rest of those concerned and stopped disrupting the OAU peace initiative. To my surprise, Kazankin let this go without comment.

Miscelleanous

During the course of the lunch, Kazankin complained about knowing so few Embassy Americans and not seeing them around. I acknowledged we'd had some personnel shifts and he rather transparently asked about Waldimir Skotzko and Robert Lessard. I confirmed they had gone and said replacements were coming. He did not ask where they had gone, nor the names of their replacements. At an earlier lunch, Kazankin had invited me to a Sauna at the Soviet Trade Mission in south Tehran. I had ducked out, and when he repeated the invitation, said I would certainly have no time until the Presidential visit was over, and wondered what the purpose of the Sauna was. He stiffened up, and said I could bring "one of your people" with me; I countered by asking if he had received permission to come to the American Embassy restaurant yet, and offered to let him bring "one of your security men." Kazankin smiled and said 'I come alone," and I said that sometime next year, when he came to the Caravansari restaurant, we could eat together and then I would go to the Soviet Sauna. He mumbled that something could be worked out. (COMMENT: Kazankin was obviously nonplussed and unprepared for a hard line, even failing to counter asperity with propaganda salvos as he usually does. When the lunch ended, he was sweating profusely (his ulcer may have been acting up) and forgot to try to schedule another lunch date, which he has never failed to do previously. My manner throughout was thin-smile-and-irritation, or nicely nasty toward the Soviet Government without being personally abusive to Kazankin except to suggest that he was very poor political officer if he did not know what I was talking about.